



# **Leadership Principles Leveraged from Key Civil War Battles**

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### **Abstract**

The purpose of this research is to answer the question: How can the strategic leadership lessons learned from three Civil War battles help today's acquisition leaders be more effective? This research analyzes the leadership of North and South Army commanders during three Civil War battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg. The Army commanders analyzed are: Ambrose Burnside, Robert E. Lee, George Meade, and George McClellan. Specifically, this analysis begins with what is learned from each commander and battle, and further addresses the comparison of each battle's, strategic objectives, mission planning, terrain, troops available, time, leaders and their traits, critical strategic leadership decisions, rationale, consequences, and implications. The objective after conducting this analysis and comparison is to create a set of lessons learned from each Civil War battle and leader for use by today's acquisition leaders, and how the conclusions of this research can be used by present day strategic and acquisition leaders.

## **Chapter 1 - Introduction**

### **Background**

Contemporary acquisition managers and leaders encounter many challenges in today's ever changing workplace environment. Today's leaders are faced with information overload, shrinking budgets, and reduction in personnel. They are expected to do more with less and manage chaos on a daily basis. Managers today are typically recognized and hired for their technical skills and, sadly, have not received a great deal of formal communication, leadership, management and organizational development training prior to becoming a supervisor within an organization (Ruggero, 2013).

Junior, middle, and senior managers can learn from lessons of past Civil War leaders and apply those experiences to prepare themselves to responsibly lead acquisition organizations at any level. Leaders are typically promoted based on potential, or in some cases politically elevated into more responsible positions. During the American Civil War many levels of command encountered similar situations among the commissioned and noncommissioned officer corps. There were many decisive leadership failures and successes during Civil War engagements. This paper will analyze and compare strategic decisions and lessons learned from leaders involved in three Civil War battles: Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg. It will explore how those past critical decisions apply to developing more adept and affective acquisition leaders. As George Santayana states, "Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute there remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual....Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905).

### **Problem Statement**

How can the strategic leadership lessons learned from three Civil War battles help today's acquisition leaders be more effective?

**Purpose of this Study**

The purpose of this research paper is to conduct a literature review of three Civil War battles to determine if the leadership decisions from the Civil War leaders led to successes or failures in those battles, and how those decisions might apply to the decisions facing acquisition leaders today. The approach is to analyze and compare the strategic decisions made by past leaders involved in each battle (Antietam, Fredericksburg and Gettysburg) to determine how well the past decisions apply to decisions made by today's acquisition leaders.

As part of the research process, the researcher reviewed Civil War Battle literature and analyzed the strategic objectives, mission planning, terrain, troops available, time, and leadership decisions, and implications of those decisions for the outcome of each Civil War battle (Fredericksburg, Gettysburg and Antietam). The question asked, "How do 150 year-old strategic leadership decisions apply to present day acquisition decision makers?"

The general approach is to use a qualitative method to obtain pertinent data from books, journals, periodicals, and videos in this area of leadership research. The review of literature will entail analyzing specific intended or unintended key decisions made by battle field commanders, by developing lessons learned from their actions to see if principles from the past can be used by present day leaders. The proposal is to develop a set of focused research questions to structure the analysis to obtain relevant data and implications from the literature review, regarding critical decisions made during each battle. These research questions are identified later in this chapter.

Furthermore, this researcher will take the findings from the literature review to identify the relevant information required prior to conducting an analysis and comparison phase. The analysis begins with what has been learned, and addresses again the comparison of each battle's, strategic objectives, mission planning, terrain, troops available, time, leader traits, critical strategic leadership decisions, rationale, consequences, and implications. The objective after conducting this analysis and comparison is to create

a set of lessons learned from Civil War battles for possible use by acquisition leaders, and to determine if the conclusions of the research can be used by present day strategic and acquisition leaders.

### **Significance of This Research**

Developing current and future leaders is critical to the Acquisition Corps. The expected outcome of this research is lessons learned from historical leaders' decisions that today's acquisition leaders can use to develop and sustain their leadership skills.

### **Overview of the Research Methodology**

A comprehensive literature review was the primary research method utilized for this research paper. The purpose of the literature review was to find data and information regarding analysis of critical leadership decisions made, and implications of those decisions during the Battles of Fredericksburg, Antietam and Gettysburg. The information was gleaned from books, Civil War soldiers' diaries, research papers, internet searches, DVDs, staff studies, magazine articles, and from professional journals.

### **Research Questions**

The research questions are as follow:

- Based upon the battles of Antietam, Gettysburg, and Fredericksburg, what were those preliminary events taken by the North and South that led-up to each battle and what were the strategic objectives and goals of each side?
- How did the North and South commanders' decisions influence both successes and failures?
- What are the profiles of these commanders, such as, leadership traits, experiences, past decisions, successes and failures that caused those leaders to make those battlefield decisions?
- Why did the leaders succeed or fail? Was it the decision itself or a failure to implement it?
- What were the common and different aspects between the north and south leaders, and between the three battles?

- What leadership and decision making lessons can be learned from these battles, and are they applicable to current day leaders? If so, how do they apply to acquisition programs and leaders?

### **Expected Outcomes**

The expected outcome of this research is lessons learned from each of the battles that can be used to train and sustain acquisition leaders. This research paper may be used in whole or in part during officer professional development classes and in civilian developmental and sustainment leadership training. Furthermore, these lessons learned can be used by leaders in program executive offices (PEO), program offices, the establishment of new programs and Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC).

### **Limitations of the Study**

This research is limited by only being qualitative in nature through written and video sources, such as books and DVDs. Also, the research is derived by information obtained from the literature review, which limits the thoroughness of the research. No interviews were conducted during this study.

### **Validity of the Research**

This research is assumed to be valid because study information was derived from source documentation written by creditable historians and authors. It is recommended that follow-on research on this topic be conducted in a quantitative study to become more statistical in nature.

## **Chapter 2 – Literature Review**

### **Introduction**

This chapter presents a literature review of three strategically important battles of the American Civil War. The battles used for this research are: Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg. This review assesses whether the foundations for an effective or ineffective Civil War leader, key decision making principles, and lessons learned from these three battles have applicability to modern day acquisition leaders. The literature review involves research of contemporary and historical books, journals, periodicals, videos, and accounts from Civil War leaders involved these battles. Through this analysis, we identify what caused the battle, the background and the outcome of each battle, and the strategic objectives of the Union and Confederate armies. In addition, this study identifies some of the key North and South leaders who played a critical role, and further describes each leader's traits and experiences that were instrumental in the pivotal decisions made, to include their implementation of plans that impacted the final outcome of each battle. Finally, we analyze the commonalities and differences between the Union and Confederate leaders, and among the battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg. The objective after conducting this analysis and comparison is to determine if these leadership lessons learned from the Civil War battles are applicable to contemporary acquisition leaders.

### **Antietam Campaign (Battle of Sharpsburg)**

#### **Prelude to the Battle of Antietam**

Setting the stage for the Battle of Antietam begins with a series of Confederate victories in the South by General Robert E. Lee, who replaced General Joseph Johnston as the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 3, 1862. Johnston was wounded by a rifle bullet then, by a fragment from a shell at the Battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks, and was unable to remain in command (Crompton, 2014). With the Union trying to find a competent commander and new strategic plan, General Lee reorganized the Army and removed incompetent political generals pampered by Jefferson Davis (Shaara, 2006). Lee also divided the Army of Northern Virginia into two parts, one wing "the hammer" commanded by

“Stonewall” Jackson, and the other wing “the anvil” by James “Pete” Longstreet, (Shaara, 2006). Emboldened by victories in the South and recent success at Second Manassas, Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee revised the Confederate war strategy to invade the North, and capitalize on the momentum of the Army’s victories against the Union. From Davis’ and Lee’s perspective it was now or never. The Confederate Army attrition of men and material during the first half of 1862 was significant and, if the South did not take the offensive action soon, the ability and timing to invade the North might not arise again (Crompton, 2014). The decision was to shift the current strategic objectives from the “Cause”, defending the Southern states from Northern aggression, to invading the North to force the Union Army out in the open to fight away from the North’s defenses and supply bases (Stephens, 2012). This new strategy would provide the South an uninterrupted harvest and time to reconstitute war-torn farmland (Shaara, 2006). Winning a major battle on Northern soil would potentially cause the European countries, especially Britain and France, to recognize and legitimize the Confederate States of America as an independent country and support the South economically and intervene militarily. The plan was to cross the Potomac and invade Maryland. The Confederate leaders incorrectly assumed that by invading a neutral state, Maryland would secede and become the twelfth Confederate state (Haffner & Lusitana [Disc 9] 2009). On September 4, 1862, Lee, with the Army of Northern Virginia, forded the Potomac at Leesburg, Virginia and maneuvered towards Frederick, Maryland (Crompton, 2014).

The response from President Lincoln was to have the Union Army leave the defenses and engage Lee’s Army without an overall commander (Stephens, 2012). In August 1862, Lincoln had to make a difficult decision to again place Major General George McClellan in charge of the Army. Lincoln, in April 1862, due to McClellan’s poor performance during the Peninsula campaign, replaced Major General McClellan as general-in-chief of all Union armies and appointed Major General Henry Halleck as the general-in-chief (Crompton, 2014). Major General John Pope was reassigned from the Mississippi campaign to assemble and command the Army of Virginia and the defense of Washington (Stephens, 2012). This created personal animosities between the generals. When Pope’s Army of Virginia engaged

Jackson, Longstreet, and Lee at Second Bull Run (Second Manassas), Halleck repeatedly ordered McClellan to return the Army to Washington and send reinforcements to support Pope. “McClellan stalled with devious intent. He wrote his wife: I have a strong idea that Pope will be thrashed during the coming week-& very badly whipped he will be & ought to be-such a villain as he ought to bring defeat upon any cause that employs him” (Stephens, p. 76, 2012). McClellan’s Army only provides Pope with two of four corps at the end of Second Bull Run. McClellan’s insubordination and infighting contributed to the Union’s defeat by Lee (Stephens, 2012). Upon McClellan’s returned to Washington, Lincoln reappointed McClellan to the command of Washington’s defenses (Stephens, 2012). Lincoln explains to John Hay, the President’s private secretary, the unpopular reappointment of McClellan:

“He [McClellan] has acted badly in this matter, but we must use what tools we have. There is no man in the Army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he. Unquestionably, he has acted badly toward Pope. He wanted him to fail. That is unpardonable. But he is too useful just now to sacrifice.” On another occasion Lincoln said, “If he can’t fight himself, he excels in making others fight” (Stephens, p. 76, 2012).

With McClellan’s many shortcomings, Lincoln had no other commanders to draw on, so he had to reluctantly reinstate McClellan as the overall field commander. The main reason Lincoln restored McClellan as the commander was McClellan’s ability to motivate and instill confidence in the soldiers (Crompton, 2014).

President Lincoln needed a major strategic victory. The Union’s strategy at Antietam was to contain and destroy Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia on Northern soil. Crushing the Army of Northern Virginia could potentially end the Civil War. Lincoln also needed a legitimate political victory to impact the midterm election and the growing anti-war sentiment in the North. As Sun Tzu stated, “National unity is deemed...to be an essential requirement of a victorious war” (Griffith, p. 38, 1971). With a strategic victory, Lincoln planned to free the slaves in the rebellious Southern states through the Emancipation Proclamation and unify the North (Crompton, 2014).



**Battle of Antietam Overview**

On September 16, 1862, Major General George B. McClellan, maneuvered the Union Army's 87,000 soldiers to come face-to-face with General Robert E. Lee's 45,000 soldiers at Sharpsburg, Maryland, Figure 1- Antietam Battlefield Map. Even though McClellan had obtained one of Lee's lost Special Order 191 (Lee's battle plan), McClellan's perception of overwhelming Confederate forces and his indecisiveness to delay the Union's attack gave Lee the time to consolidate the Confederate Army with well-prepared defenses, on key terrain, to the east of Sharpsburg. At 5:30 A.M. on September 17, 1862, elements of Major General Joseph Hooker's Union 1st Corps attacked Lee's left flank which began the Battle of Antietam, the single bloodiest day in American military history. Repeated Union attacks, and aggressive Confederate counterattacks, seesawed back and forth across Miller's cornfield and the West Wood. Even at a numerical disadvantage, Stonewall Jackson's forces positioned in the vicinity of Dunker Church would hold the Confederate defensive positions. At the same time, towards the center of the battlefield, Union forces attack against the Sunken Road or Bloody Lane and would occupy the Confederate center after a horrific struggle for this key defensive terrain feature. Unfortunately, McClellan did not follow up with fresh Union forces to exploit this tactical advantage over the Confederates, so this event was only a temporary success (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

At 2:00 P.M., and on McClellan's left, Major General Ambrose Burnside's corps finally pushed across a stone bridge known as Rohrbach Bridge (Burnside Bridge) over the Antietam Creek, and with some difficulty managed to take the bridge two hours later. Burnside was late in commencing the attack against the Confederates and could have crossed the creek downstream much earlier in the day. After the Union Army crossed the bridge, the Confederate right flank was in jeopardy of collapsing, so the Confederates withdrew. Burnside was only satisfied with occupying the high ground on the west side of Antietam Creek and into Sharpsburg. Early that morning, Lee ordered Jackson to move A.P. Hill's division from Harpers Ferry to Sharpsburg, a seventeen mile forced march. In late afternoon, A.P. Hill's




Figure 1 – Antietam Battlefield Map (Antietam Map, 2016)

division from Harpers Ferry to Sharpsburg, a seventeen mile forced march. In late afternoon, A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry, and at the right time, counterattacked, driving back Burnside's soldiers back across the bridge and from flanking the Confederates; thereby, saving the possible annihilation of the Army of Northern Virginia at Sharpsburg. Outnumbered two-to-one, Lee committed the entire Army of Northern Virginia during the Battle of Antietam, while McClellan utilized less than 75 percent of the Union Army. McClellan's lack of coordination and risk adverse approach to the battle negated to fully leverage the Unions Army superior force while allowing Lee to freely maneuver the Confederate forces from one critical engagement to another. As night fell, both battered armies faced each other in more or less the same positions the armies occupied at the start of the battle. In spite of two corps of fresh troops, who did not see action, McClellan did nothing to bring the final blow to Lee's crippled Army. On 18 September, Lee knew the Confederate Army could not engage in another major fight, so under cover of darkness and rain, the Confederates withdrew through Sharpsburg and crossed the Potomac River into the South. McClellan lost the opportunity to destroy the Confederate Army. Furthermore, McClellan again disappointed Abraham Lincoln, by not using the two fresh corps to aggressively pursue the wounded Confederate Army. Many strategists and historians judge the Battle of Antietam, the bloodiest single day in American military history a draw. In one day of fighting, approximately 25,000 Americans, both North and South, were killed, wounded or went missing. Abraham Lincoln and the Union claimed a strategic victory, causing the Confederates to give up the objective of invading the North and returning south across the Potomac River. This bloody battle, which forced Lee to withdraw from "Maryland, Antietam Bridge would give Lincoln the "victory" that he needed before delivering the Emancipation Proclamation — a document that would forever change the geopolitical course of the American Civil War" ("Antietam," p.1, 2014) (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

## **Fredericksburg Campaign**

### **Prelude to the Battle of Fredericksburg**

After the Battle of Antietam, McClellan pursued Lee into the South by crossing the Potomac River. McClellan had no plan and was reluctant to confront Lee so soon after Antietam. McClellan could have engaged either wing of Lee's Army with overwhelming combat force, but did not and erred on the side of caution. As a result of delays, McClellan on November 7, 1862, was relieved by Lincoln from command of the Army of the Potomac, and replaced by Ambrose Burnside, who reluctantly accepted. Burnside was likable, modest, and supportive of his superiors, unlike McClellan who was toxic with the senior military and political leadership. Burnside had the ability to lead at the division and corps, but did not have the killer instinct to lead a large formation like the Army of the Potomac. Burnside also tended to err on the side of desperate action, unlike McClellan who erred on the side of caution. The Army of the Potomac had become so massive that the span of control by commanders became unwieldy. Immediately upon taking command, Burnside reorganized the Army of the Potomac into three grand corps for better command and control (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

Like McClellan and with mid-term elections looming, Burnside was getting pressure from Lincoln to move quickly against the South. Politically, Lincoln needs to be seen as a strong leader by producing a military success before the North public loses confidence in the administration. The Emancipation Proclamation was seen as the last gasp effort for the Union, and considered a controversial event among most Northern soldiers. The Northern soldiers were fighting to preserve the Union and not for the blacks. To avoid political criticism that previously plagued McClellan, Burnside wanted to move quickly against the South to capture Richmond and end the war. Burnside developed a plan to cross the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg; then move quickly to capture the Confederate Capital of Richmond and draw out Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia between the Army of the Potomac and Richmond, providing the advantage to North. The plan relied on quick movement and deception. The problem with Burnside's plan was in the execution. The roads were muddy which bogged down the Army of the Potomac's men,

wagons, and materiel on the march to Fredericksburg. Burnside did make it in time to Rappahannock River for the first ever river crossing by the United States Army under fire; however, the pontoon bridges were late getting to Burnside. Burnside lost the element of surprise. This delay in receiving the pontoon bridges cost time and element of surprise for the North, allowing the Army of Northern Virginia to concentrate and prepare formidable defensive positions on the high ground west of Fredericksburg (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

In 1862, the South was in bad shape with losses in the west by Union forces, especially the capture of New Orleans. The prices of goods doubled in Richmond. The price of bread became so high; there were food riots in the City. Lee also reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia and had Jackson and Longstreet promoted to lieutenant-generals, each commanding one wing or corps of the Army. Lee promoted Edward Porter Alexander as the Army's new commander of ordinance. Alexander was one the best subordinate commanders in the Confederate Army. Lee understood Burnside whose plans and movements were readily detectable. Lee had about two weeks to concentrate the Southern forces on strategically defensible ground. The goals of the Confederacy were to stop the Army of the Potomac from capturing Fredericksburg and moving onto Richmond, and to efficiently use limited resources with minimum loss of soldiers during the battle (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

### **Battle of Fredericksburg Overview**

The Battle of Fredericksburg was fought December 11-15, 1862, Figure 2 - Battle of Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862, and was purported by historians as one of the largest engagement of troops of the Civil War. It was a disaster for the Army of the Potomac with the enormous numbers of casualties inflicted by the Confederates on Burnside's Army. The battle entailed the first major river crossing by soldiers, under fire, in American military history. Another first is Union and Confederate troops fought house to house in the streets of Fredericksburg without any written tactics and procedures. This is the Civil War's first urban combat operation. These two firsts were evolutionary leap ahead tactics in

American warfare. With roughly 200,000 soldiers, no other Civil War battle had a larger concentration of soldiers (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

On December 11, 1862, thousands of soldiers from the Army of the Potomac crossed the pontoon bridges over the Rappahannock River into Fredericksburg under heavy Confederate fire. Although the Union soldiers came under heavy sniper and artillery fire, but they managed to cross the river utilizing the pontoon bridges. One Confederate regiment was left behind in the city to delay the Union advance and buy time for Lee to finalize the Confederate defenses on the high ground west of Fredericksburg. This Confederate regiment achieved a major tactical objective by using urban warfare tactics to gain one additional day for Lee and Longstreet to make final arrangements for the upcoming battle. Another one day delay to Burnside's plan was the logistics of moving the Army across the bridges and positioning for the assault against Marye's Heights (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

Burnside's plan for the Battle of Fredericksburg was a two prong attack, the first prong was to initially commit approximately 60,000 men from Major General William B. Franklin's Left Grand Division to assault Lee's southern flank on Prospect Hill, while the remainder of Burnside's Army would hold Longstreet and the Confederate First Corps in position at Marye's Heights. The Union Army's main effort was against Stonewall Jackson's wing on the right flank of Lee's Army. The Union Army took the initiative by assaulting first which yielded some initial success by finding the weakest point of Jackson's defenses. Meade's division breached the Confederate line and made it to the road running behind Jackson's defenses. The Confederate right flank was in jeopardy of being enveloped and destroyed, but lack of reinforcements to exploit Meade's breach and Jackson's powerful counterattack by the reserves forced Meade to retreat. Tens of thousands of Franklin's Union soldiers stood idle across the open plain behind Meade's division that could have supported Meade's breach in the Confederate line. Burnside did not have good situational awareness of the battle and thought that there was progress made by the Union reinforcements. Burnside's and Lee's Armies sustained significant losses, totaling 9,000 killed, wounded






Figure 2 – Fredericksburg Battlefield Map (Fredericksburg Map, 2016)

and missing, with no change in the tactical and operational situation (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

On the northern end of the battlefield or second prong, Burnside's "diversion" against Longstreet's Confederate soldiers behind a stone wall caused a heavy number of Union casualties. Hooker attacked for a total of fourteen waves against the Confederate emplacements on Marye's Heights, but each wave of Federal troops was met with catastrophic wall of musket and artillery fire from strongly fortified Confederate defensive positions. Confederate Chief of Artillery, Colonel Edward Porter Alexander stated earlier to Lee that "a chicken could not live on that field" proved to be entirely prophetic on this bloody day at Fredericksburg (Shaara, 2006, p. 60). As night fell across the battlefield, the Union dead and wounded, sometimes stacked three deep, covered the ground; it was obvious that a Confederate victory was at hand. The Battle of Fredericksburg had been a disaster for Burnside. Burnside was very emotionally upset with the number of casualties that the Army of the Potomac had incurred at the hands of the Confederate Army, so Burnside insisted on attacking Marye's Heights again in the morning. With morale crushed and units depleted, the Union senior commanders persuaded Burnside out of renewing the attack. Burnside eventually relented and wisely withdrew the Army, the night of December 15, back across the Rappahannock and moved the Union Army from the Fredericksburg area of operation (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

In the end, the Army of the Potomac had suffered an estimated "13,300 casualties, nearly two-thirds of them in on the slopes of Marye's Heights. Lee's Army had suffered some 4,500 losses" (Antietam, 2014, p.1). Robert E. Lee, from his hilltop headquarters watching the Confederate victory materialize over the battlefield exclaimed, "It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" (Antietam, 2014, p.1). Burnside was instantly condemned by the Washington political establishment and the newspapers. Publicly, Burnside accepted responsibility for the horrific debacle at Fredericksburg. As fate would have it, on January 25, 1863, Lincoln replaced Burnside with Major General Joe Hooker as the new commander of the Army of the Potomac (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).



## **Gettysburg Campaign**

### **Prelude to the Battle of Gettysburg**

After Lee's victory over Fighting Joe Hooker and the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Chancellorsville from April 30 to May 6, 1863, Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis decided it was strategically advantageous to invade the North a second time, since the Union Army's senior command structure was in chaos and the Army was totally demoralized. Lee was under political pressure to develop a plan that would take the pressure off of the Confederate garrison at Vicksburg, and hopefully, by fighting one last major battle would end the Civil War and gain independence for the Confederacy. Jefferson Davis believed that another major invasion of the North by the Confederate Army of the Northern Virginia would create factors in favor of the South; thereby, ending the war. Furthermore, the Confederate Army was on the verge of starvation, it was time to take the war to the North, who had experienced little of the war up to this point in time. The invasion of the North would provide the Confederates the opportunity to forage for subsistence from the rich Northern farms and the fertile land while giving war-ravaged Virginia farms and land a much-needed break from war. The Army of Northern Virginia was in need of war materiel, equipment, and all sorts of supplies and especially shoes (Crompton, 2014) (Gettysburg, 2014).

On June 18, the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia began moving north. After the death of Stonewall Jackson, Lee reorganized the two large corps into three new corps. The new corps were commanded by "Lieutenant General James Longstreet (First Corps), Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell (Second), and Lieutenant General. A.P. Hill (Third); both Ewell and Hill, who had formerly reported to Jackson as division commanders, were new to this level of responsibility. The Cavalry Division remained under the command of Major General J.E.B. Stuart" [during this campaign] (Crompton, 2014, p. 214). Lieutenant General Ewell was the lead corps and was in southern Pennsylvania by June 25. Lee moved the Army quicker into position than during the 1862 Maryland campaign. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia which number 72,000 could possibly pose a threat to the cities of Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and strengthen the growing Northern peace movement (Crompton, 2014) (Gettysburg, 2014).

The North was alarmed at the speed at which Lee's Army moved into Maryland and southern Pennsylvania. "*The New York Times* headline read, "INVASION: The New Rebel Movement Northward," which contained an enormous map of Maryland and southern Pennsylvania" (Crompton, 2014, p. 214). Lincoln's strategy was to protect Washington D.C., and destroy the Army of Northern Virginia on northern soil. The strategic objective was to hold the country together and preserve the Union. Lincoln needed a general to successfully implement these strategic objectives. On June 28, 186, General George Meade was appointed as the commander of the Army of the Potomac (Crompton, 2014) (Gettysburg, 2014).

"Why were the Union and Confederate armies converging on the little town of Gettysburg? The long and involved answer is the "roads," but the short and simple one is "shoes." Both answers...explain why Gettysburg would soon become a household name throughout America" (Crompton, 2014, p. 216).


### **Battle of Gettysburg Overview**

President Abraham Lincoln, ultimately pressured Major General Joseph Hooker to cross the Potomac River with the Army of the Potomac and pursue Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, on June 28, 1863, Hooker submitted a resignation from command of the Union Army of the Potomac to President Lincoln only three days before the Battle of Gettysburg. Lincoln replaced Hooker with Major General George Gordon Meade. As with Burnside, Meade was reluctant to accept the new command. In the end, Meade's dedication to duty, Meade accepted the assignment as the commander of the Army. Time was against Meade, so as the new commander, Meade was forced to take the initiative and pursue Lee's northward march into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Meade moved the Union Army more quickly and efficiently than Lee had anticipated so Meade was able to keep the Union Army of the Potomac between the Army Northern of Virginia and Washington, D.C. The unexpected quick movement of the Union Army to catch Lee's main force also created a situation which isolated J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry, which was over extended and caught to the east of the Union Army's line of march. Stuart's riding around the Union Army to gain glory caused this untenable situation that the Union Army was positioned between Lee and Stuart, Figure 3- Gettysburg Campaign. Stuart was unable to fulfill the mission "...to keep a close eye on Meade's

Army and to report any significant movements to Lee” (Shaara, 2006, p. 86). Stuart was the “eyes and ears” (Shaara, 2006, p. 86), and Lee was blind to the movement of Meade’s Army. On June 28, a scout paid for by Longstreet, provides intelligence to Lee that the Army of the Potomac was marching parallel to Lee’s Army and located in Frederick, Maryland. Without any word from Stuart and in an unfamiliar area, Lee was forced to use maps, to make critical decisions. After a map reconnaissance, Lee decided to consolidate the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg which had an extensive network of roads converging like spokes of a wheel with the town as a hub. This was a natural place for Lee to concentrate the Army of Northern Virginia (Crompton, 2014) (Gettysburg, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

On June 30, 1863, Major General Henry Heth’s division was stationed at Cashtown Pass, just west of Gettysburg. Heth’s scouts reported that there were supplies and a warehouse full of shoes located in Gettysburg. The scouts also reported the sighting of Union cavalry in the vicinity of the town. Heth’s corps commander, A.P.Hill, authorized Heth to conduct a reconnaissance in force into the town of Gettysburg the next day (Shaara, 2006).

On July 1, 1863 the first day of battle (Figure 4- 1<sup>st</sup> Day), Heth’s Confederate infantry division had a meeting engagement with two brigades of the Union cavalry, west and north of Gettysburg. The Union cavalry, under the command of Brigadier General John Buford, temporarily delayed the Confederate advance into Gettysburg. Buford used dismounted cavalry with breech-loading carbines to hold off an overwhelming Confederate force until the Union infantry could arrive. The Federal 1st and 11th Corps with Major General John Reynolds arrived in Gettysburg just in time to reinforce Buford’s two cavalry brigades. Once the 1st and 11th Corps were positioned, the 1st to the west and the 11th to the north, the 1st and 11th were attacked by additional Confederate units under the command of A.P. Hill and Richard Ewell. The 11th Corps, under the command of Major General Oliver Howard, engaged overwhelming Confederate forces from the north and was forced to retreat. This exposed the 1st Corps




**Figure 3 – Gettysburg Campaign (through July 3) (Gettysburg Map, 2016)**

Cavalry movements shown with dashed lines. █ Confederate █ Union

flank and had no other option but to withdrawal through Gettysburg. In the end 30,000 Confederates defeated 20,000 Union forces, who ultimately withdrew through Gettysburg to take up new defensive

positions south of town on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill. Meade arrived late that night (Gettysburg, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).



**Figure 4 – Gettysburg Battlefield Map – 1<sup>st</sup> Day (Gettysburg Map, 2016)**

The fight on July 1 was clearly a Confederate victory over the Union Army. On July 2, the second day of the battle, Figure 5 - 2<sup>nd</sup> Day, The Army of Northern Virginia occupied the ridgeline west of

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Gettysburg called Seminary Ridge, about a mile from the Union Army. Meade's Army was preparing deliberate defensive positions on the high ground south of Gettysburg for the duration of the battle. The Federals had the high ground and Longstreet recommended to Lee that Army of Northern Virginia move further south of Gettysburg and find key terrain between the Union Army and Washington D.C. The location of the Confederate Army would create great fear in the populace, politicians, and Lincoln; thereby, achieving the strategic objective of pressuring President Lincoln to negotiate for peace. The problem with disengaging the Confederate Army from Gettysburg is Stuart was still missing and Lee would be blind moving in unknown terrain. Furthermore, Lee was so fixated on defeating the Union Army and bringing the war to an end, he could not see any other courses of actions except to attack. The Union was preparing defensive positions in the shape of a "fishhook in the hills and ridges south of Gettysburg with around 90,000 soldiers. The Confederates essentially wrapped and paralleled the Army around the Union position with 70,000 soldiers" (Gettysburg, 2014, p. 1).

The afternoon of July 2, Figure 6, Lee's strategy was to execute two simultaneous assaults against the Union defenses, at either end of the fishhook, in an attempt to roll up both flanks. Longstreet was unable to find the Union's flank and tried to conceal the corps movement from Union observers, so it took most of the day to get the corps into position so Lee's plan was not implemented as a coordinated attack. Vicious fighting raged at Devil's Den, Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, and Cemetery Ridge. Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Chamberlain's Maine regiment was positioned on Little Round Top with the order "to hold at all costs" the flank of the Union Army (Shaara, 2006, p 95). On Culp's Hill and East Cemetery Hill, the demonstration turned into full-scale assault. The Union still held strong defensive positions at the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> day (Crompton, 2014) (Gettysburg, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).






Figure 5 – Gettysburg Battlefield Map – 2<sup>nd</sup> Day (Gettysburg Map, 2016)

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On July 3, the third day and final day of the battle, Figure 6 – 3<sup>rd</sup> Day, resumed between the Union and Confederate forces on Culp's Hill, along with cavalry battles to the east and south of Gettysburg. Meade's battle plan was to stay in place and let Lee make the next move. Stuart arrived at Lee's headquarters the afternoon of the 2<sup>nd</sup> day, so the Army finally had the eyes and ears back. Lee's plan for the third day was to conduct a well-coordinated attack against an assumed weak Union's center and bring about total victory, while Longstreet and others wanted to withdraw from the field of battle. Again, Lee could only see destroying the Union Army in order to win the war. Lee ordered Longstreet to assault with three divisions. Picket's division was the main assaulting force with approximately "12,000 Confederates against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge--Pickett's Charge"(Gettysburg, 2014, p. 1). Picket's brigade commanders were James Kemper, Richard Garnett, and Lewis a. 'Lo" Armistead. Picket's charge began with an artillery bombardment at 1:04 P.M.; by Colonel Porter Alexander, on the Union center defensive positions prior to the Confederate infantry attack. Unfortunately, the fuses used were from the Charleston Armory instead of the Richmond Armory which had been destroyed by fire earlier that year. The Charleston fuses burned longer than the Richmond fuses. Alexander's artillery crews were used to using Richmond fuses. The artillery rounds used by the Confederate artillery delayed exploding and overshot the Union lines. The artillery had little effect on the Union main defenses. Eventually, Picket charged and the assault was repulsed by a tightly packed Union defense that used rifle and artillery fire along the defensive line while the Union officer's had the ability to move reinforcements quickly along at any point in the line which had a break through. This charge was the final death blow to the Confederacy in achieving the strategic objectives. With great losses to the Confederate Army, Lee retreated back to Virginia. Both the sides lost about 51,000 soldiers that were killed, wounded, captured, or missing in action over the course of the battle. "Four months after the battle, President Lincoln used the dedication ceremony for Gettysburg's Soldiers National Cemetery to honor the fallen Union soldiers and redefine the purpose of the war in his historic Gettysburg Address" (Gettysburg, 2014, p. 1) (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).






Figure 6 – Gettysburg Battlefield Map – 3<sup>rd</sup> Day (Gettysburg Map, 2016)

**Summary**

In summation, there is an infinite amount of information with regards to the battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg. Furthermore, there are volumes written from many different perspectives on the key decisions and leadership connected with each one of these battles. This literature review attempted to only capture the high points or high level overview of each battle. Chapter 4 will identify and thoroughly analyze specific key leadership decisions, at critical moments, in the conflict that determined the outcome of each battle.

### **Chapter 3 – Research Methodology**

#### **Purpose of this Study/Conceptual Model**

The purpose of this research paper is to conduct a literature review of three Civil War battles to determine if the leadership decisions from the Civil War leaders led to successes or failures in those battles, and how those decisions might apply to the decisions facing acquisition leaders today. The approach is to analyze and compare the strategic decisions made by past leaders involved in each battle (Antietam, Fredericksburg and Gettysburg) to determine how well the past decisions apply to decisions made by today's acquisition leaders.


As part of the research process, the researcher reviewed Civil War Battle literature and analyzed the strategic objectives, mission planning, terrain, troops available, time, and leadership decisions, and implications of those decisions for the outcome of each Civil War battle (Fredericksburg, Gettysburg and Antietam). The question asked, "How do 150 year-old strategic leadership decisions apply to present day acquisition decision makers?"

The general approach is to use a qualitative method to obtain pertinent data from books, journals, periodicals, and videos in this area of leadership research. The review of literature will entail analyzing specific intended or untended key decisions made by battle field commanders by developing lessons learned from their actions to see if principles from the past can be used by present day leaders. The proposal is to develop a set of focused research questions to structure the analysis around in order to obtain relevant data and implications from the literature review regarding critical decisions made during each battle. These research questions are identified below.

The conceptual model (Figure 7 - Thematic and Descriptive Analysis of Battles) is to conduct a thematic and descriptive analysis of the literature review to ferret out the key decisions made by Civil War commanders, and to determine if there are critical leadership lessons that can be learned from these decisions and utilized by today's acquisition leaders.

Thematic analysis and descriptive approach are defined as:

- A thematic approach includes extensive discussion about major themes that arise from analyzing a qualitative database. Often, this approach uses extensive quotes and rich details to support the themes. Often, these themes are interrelated and incorporated within specific qualitative designs, such as grounded theory, ethnographic, or narrative designs (Creswell, 2015, p. 274).
- A descriptive approach incorporates a detailed description of people and places to carry the narrative. A study in this mode might convey “a typical day in the life” of an individual (Creswell, 2015, p. 274).



**Figure 8 – Thematic and Descriptive Analysis of Battles**

Furthermore, this researcher will take the findings from the literature review to identify the relevant information required prior to conducting an analysis and comparison phase. The analysis begins with what has been learned, and addresses again the comparison of each battle's, strategic objectives, mission planning, terrain, troops available, time, leader traits, critical strategic leadership decisions, rationale, consequences, and implications. The objective after conducting this analysis and comparison is to create

a set of lessons learned from Civil War battles for possible use by acquisition leaders, and to determine if the conclusions of the research can be used by present day strategic and acquisition leaders.

### **Research Questions**

The research questions are as follow:

- Based upon the battles of Antietam, Gettysburg, and Fredericksburg, what were those preliminary events taken by the North and South that led-up to each battle and what were the strategic objectives and goals of each side?
- How did the North and South commanders' decisions influence both successes and failures?
- What are the profiles of these commanders, such as, leadership traits, experiences, past decisions, successes and failures that caused those leaders to make those battlefield decisions?
- Why did the leaders succeed or fail? Was it the decision itself or a failure to implement it?
- What were the common and different aspects between the north and south leaders, and between the three battles?
- What leadership and decision making lessons can be learned from these battles, and are they applicable to current day leaders? If so, how do they apply to acquisition programs and leaders?

### **Research Process/Data Collection**

A comprehensive literature review was the primary research method utilized for this research paper. The purpose of the literature review was to find data and information regarding analysis of critical leadership decisions made and implications of those decisions during the Battles of Fredericksburg, Antietam, and Gettysburg. The information was gleaned from books, Civil War soldiers' diaries, research papers, internet searches, DVDs, staff studies, magazine articles, and from professional journals.

## **Chapter 4 – Findings**

### **Introduction**

The purpose of this research is to conduct a literature review of historical resources on the Civil War battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg, to determine if the same leadership decisions from the past leaders led to successes or failures in those battles and how well those decisions or lessons learned apply to modern day leadership. The approach is to conduct an analysis and comparison of leadership competencies and the strategic decisions made by those past leaders involved in each battle (Antietam, Fredericksburg and Gettysburg) and to determine if those lessons learned from Civil War leaders are applicable to present day acquisition leaders.

### **The 5 Ps Leadership Model**

The framework for analyzing this historical information is derived from the literature review and using the thematic and descriptive approaches to organize the information. To analyze this information as to whether a leader is good or bad, the researcher will utilize the Five Ps (5Ps) Leadership Analysis tool. It is difficult to determine or define whether any leader, including a Civil War leader, is a good or bad leader solely based off of analyzing one aspect of leadership, such as traits. Analyzing only one aspect of a leader, and not considering other factors, leaves the researcher making limited assessments in a vacuum. For instance, “..., viewing leadership through a narrow lens may limit an individual’s ability to accurately pinpoint the sources of success or failure [of leader]” (Hull & Allen, 2012, p. 246). When assessing the effectiveness of a leader, other variables and sub-factors need included in the overall assessment, such as, followers, technology, intelligence, and situation, just to name a few. “In fact, a major challenge to the study and practice of leadership is the many traits, abilities, skills, competencies, processes a leader must possess to be successful” (Hull & Allen, 2012, p. 246). As addressed above, there are many internal and external forces that contribute to making a leader a success or a failure (Hull & Allen, 2012).

The 5 Ps of the Leadership Model takes into account a total of five dimensions when analyzing the leader's competency or incompetency. Hull & Allen (2012) identify the dimensions in the 5Ps Leadership tool as:

1. **Personal Attributes** are the traits, knowledge, skills, and abilities that leaders embody (Bass, 2008; Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002; McCrae & Costa, 1997; Stodgill, 1948, in Hull & Allen, 2012, p.247). These traits vary from person to person, and must be capitalized upon and managed depending on the context. Individuals bring natural ability in some areas (e.g., cognitive ability) but this does not mean the individual can influence, inspire, and energize a group of people. Countless combinations of the attributes of the leader (and followers) will be needed for different contexts. Leaders and followers with an intentional awareness of their positive and negative attributes can better manage the personal dimension of leadership. (p.247)

2. **Position** examines how the individual approaches the role of "leader" (Blanchard, Zigarmi, & Nelson, 1993; Gardner, 1990; Goleman, 2004; Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002; Heifetz & Linsky, 2002; McCall, 2010, in Hull & Allen, 2012, p.247). When others speak about the leader, it is often done so in deference to the role the individual occupies. Most often this person is in a position of authority over others. He or she is the president, executive director, or branch manager. However, if leadership is in fact a process of influence, then the Position need not be a formal one. In other words, each person can step into and out of leadership—often in a moment's notice. Upon critical examination, a person with a position of authority or leadership could not act as a leader and those without a title (e.g., Gandhi, Mother Theresa) may in fact be exercising leadership. Regardless of how the individual obtained the role, Position is about the style the leader uses to lead others (e.g., Blanchard, Zigarmi, & Nelson, 1993; Goleman, 2004). (p.247)

3. **Purpose** of the leader answers the question, "Leadership for what?" Leaders are clearly aligned around a cause or purpose (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985; Kouzes & Posner, 2007, in Hull & Allen, 2012, pp.247 & 248). At times the Purpose could be deemed as noble and right. At other times, an individual's Purpose may be unethical and suspect. The Purpose may be set by the board to increase shareholder value or it could be mission driven, such as eradicating cancer. A Purpose may be an individual's vision, politically motivated or community driven. Regardless, Purpose is essential. Without Purpose, a leader will have a difficult time motivating others to work hard, innovate, and in some cases, place themselves and their families in harm's way. (pp. 247 & 248)

4. **Procedure/process** of leadership describes how the leader achieves Purpose; moving the group, organization or community from point A to point B (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002; Northouse, 2010; Yukl, 2010, in Hull & Allen, 2012, p.248).). This movement may include any number of Processes (timing, strategy, initiating structure, goal achievement) or behaviors (Practices) associated with effective leadership (see Bass, 1985; Kouzes & Posner, 2007, in Hull & Allen, 2012, p.247). At times, the Practices/Processes are simple and straightforward and at other times a

complex maze of possibilities (e.g., U.S. debt ceiling crisis in August 2011). Regardless, the Practices/Processes are crucial to the Purpose and may mean the difference between success and failure. For example, the chosen Practices/Processes can energize and engage followers, model desired behaviors, and align resources and people in a common direction. In addition, there are a number of explicit and implicit rules that will foster an environment of creativity and innovation or stability and conservatism. Ultimately, the goal is for leaders to intervene skillfully (Meissen, 2010, in Hull & Allen, 2012, p.247). And act from a place of intentionality. (p. 248)

5. What is the end **Product**? Some wonder if the success or failure of the leader can be determined prior to knowing the final results of the Purpose (Ulrich, Zenger, & Smallwood, 1999, in Hull & Allen, 2012, p.247). In other words, did the individual make a positive contribution that did in fact lead the organization, country or cause to goal attainment? Did they fulfill their Purpose? Or, is the institution worse because of the intervention? In some cases it takes years, maybe decades to know the full effect of an individual's actions (or inactions) and in the end, some go down in history as great leaders who fulfilled their Purpose and others do not. (p. 248)

Even though this tool is subjective and prone to variances, using all five dimensions together can provide a relevant and consistent assessment of the leader's overall abilities (Hull & Allen, 2012).

How does the researcher use the (5Ps) Leadership Analysis tool? All 5ps must be used in conjunction with each other, and not individually, in order to obtain accurate and effective results from the analysis of the leader. The five dimensions must work together so the analysis can realize specific leader's attributes to judge, including considering the situation. Using this model correctly enables an accurate assess of the leader's performance. Each of the 5Ps is of equal importance in the model and it is not critical that a good leader be equally balanced across each dimension. However, leaders should mitigate the shortfalls with complementary variables to insure success. Finally, using the 5Ps Leadership Analysis tool, this research will analyze each Civil War battle and the respective commanders' abilities to successfully lead their armies (Hull & Allen, 2012).

## **Battle of Antietam Key Decisions, Circumstances, Outcomes, and Comparisons**

### **Profiles (Attributes) of Lee and McClellan**

There is a vast amount of literature written on the profiles of Lee and McClellan as Civil War Army commanders. History describes Robert Edward Lee as a Virginia aristocrat and a son of "Light Horse" Harry Lee, a revolutionary war hero. Lee was not in favor of slavery and state rights. Lee graduated from



West Point as a model student in math and military tactics, without receiving one demerit and graduated second in the class of 1829. Lincoln offered Lee the general in chief and command of the entire Union Army. Lee rejected the request and resigned from the United States Army when Virginia seceded from the Union. Lee was very loyal to Virginia and subsequently accepted a commission in the Confederate Army. After taking command of the Confederate Army in May 31, 1861, Lee trained, reorganized, and created an environment of positive attitude and high morale among the soldiers. Lee re-designated the Army into the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee was a gifted strategist who was a tenacious and results oriented leader who lead by example to build trust by inspiring and empowering subordinates to succeed. Lee was a loyal leader and had trusting relationships with Jefferson Davis, and fellow officers, while setting high standards for the Army to achieve. He was a calculated gambler, or risk taker, who always went for the decisive blow against the Union armies. Also Lee was “willing to take calculated risks even under the most challenging circumstances” (Hull & Allen, 2012, p.250). As Hull and Allen, on page 250, reflect:

Lee’s best known biographer, described him as follows: Lee was preeminently a strategist and a strategist because he was a sound military logician. It is well enough to speak of his splendid presence on the field of battle, his poise, his cheer, and his manner with his men, but essentially he was an intellect with a developed aptitude for the difficult synthesis of war. (p. 143)

One of Lee’s skills was to handpick subordinate leaders with the ability for creativity and independence on the battlefield. This approach may have led to Lee not “adequately disciplining subordinate generals by allowing generals like Stuart to pursue different objectives than the objectives Lee set for the Army” (Katcher, 1998, p.281) (Hull & Allen, 2012).

George Brinton McClellan was small in stature, but had a Napoleonic ego. An 1846 graduate of West Point, he fought in the Mexican War, and later served as an observer of European forces during the Crimean War. McClellan was technically superb as a highly effective organizer and strategic planner, and was also an exceptional trainer of soldiers. McClellan had charisma and was well liked by the soldiers, who affectionately nicknamed him “Little Mac” (Linedecker, 2002, p. 176). McClellan’s critical flaws

were over planning, indecisiveness, cautiousness, slowness to act, and other personal actions indicated a lack of bravery in battle which allowed the Army of Northern Virginia to escape total destruction time and time again. McClellan always thought the Confederate Army was larger in size and superior in ability which created reluctance for the Union Army to take to the offensive. McClellan never learned from those mistakes and frequently disobeyed orders from superiors. Lincoln continually ordered McClellan to take the offensive. “At one point, President Lincoln became so exasperated with the commander’s reluctance to fight that he sent [McClellan] a cable advising: “If you’re not using the Army, I’d like to borrow it!”” (Linedecker, 2002, p. 176). Crompton (2014) suggests:

Was McClellan the worst of the best? Or was he the best of the worst? As a fighting man, McClellan ranks at or near the bottom of all Civil War generals. Time and again during the Peninsula Campaign battles, he was either distant from the battlefield or else riding back and forth and accomplishing very little. Nothing in his previous military career had suggested he would be such a failure as a battlefield commander. And yet...As a military organizer, McClellan ranks at or near the top. No other Union general ever kept so many men constantly in a good state of order or so well supplied. (p. 120)

McClellan had a tenuous relationship with Lincoln and other superior officers and was constantly in conflict with anyone who objected to McClellan’s decisions and actions. McClellan was arrogant, inflexible, defensive and “an individual apt to view himself as an agent of the Lord—one who was called the role versus him seeking it out” (Sears, 1999, in Hull & Allen, 2012, p.251). Lee characterized McClellan as an “able but timid commander” (Sears, 1999, p. 273 in Hull & Allen, 2012, p.251).

### **Lee and McClellan Role (Position) of a Leader**

When examining Lee and McClellan leadership roles at the Battle of Antietam, they were completely different and separate in implementation of battle plan. Lee handpicked highly capable and trustworthy subordinate commanders, Lee was able to create a command climate to foster empowerment of individuals, trust, and high degree of individual initiative, and reward high performers’ success within the Army. Lee structured the Army to mutually support each other by easily interchanging “duties, troops, and artillery among each other” Hull & Allen, 2012, p.251). Either wings or corps was familiar and had

experience working with each other in prior battles. Lee conducted staff meetings to communicate and receive feedback on the strategy with the commanders. As a solid commander, Lee ultimately made the final decision and empowered the commanders to implement the strategy. Lee's risky strategy included dividing an under supplied Confederate Army and crossing the Potomac River to invade Maryland and eventually Pennsylvania. The Confederate Army was half the size of the Union Army. (Crompton, 2014) (Hull & Allen, 2012) (Shaara, 2006). Lee and the Confederate commanders' lead by example, in Hull & Allen, (2012),

During the Battle of Antietam, Lee and his team of generals were actively engaged in repositioning troops and artillery and encouraging their men. For example, at one critical moment, Longstreet and his field officers patched a Confederate line to keep it from breaking (McPherson, 2002). (p. 252)

McClellan again was assigned as the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The Army had six separate corps which were structured as independent commands and had no interchangeability. After the Union's devastating loss at the Second Battle of Bull Run, the Union was re-outfitted with new units and many of the corps had never seen action or even worked together as a cohesive unit. "Rivalries among the corps commanders made management of his team challenging. To tighten his control over the corps commanders, McClellan reassigned his commanders shortly before battle, promoting some and demoting others, which exacerbated their rivalries" (Sears, 1999, in Hull & Allen, 2012, p.252). To control this situation, McClellan developed the plan and micromanaged the plan with minimum feedback from the corps commanders. Good communication was rare. For example, McClellan conducted no staff meeting to disseminate the plan to the commanders "During the battle, he personally directed their actions from his headquarters, two and one-half miles from the front lines, visiting the field only once" (Sears, 1999, in Hull & Allen, 2012, p.253) (Crompton, 2014) (Stephens, (2012).

### **McClellan and Lee Purpose or Cause**

The obvious tactical purpose of Lee and McClellan was to win at Antietam. McClellan's more immediate objectives were to protect Northern cities, i.e., Washington D.C., and defeat Lee's Army. President Lincoln considered the invasion of the North an opportunity for a major strategic victory. The Union's strategy at Antietam was to militarily eliminate Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in Maryland. Destroying the Army of Northern Virginia would again possibly end the War. Lincoln also needed a political victory to impact the midterm election and the growing anti-war sentiment in the North. With a victory, Lincoln planned to free the slaves in the rebellious Southern states through the Emancipation Proclamation and unify the North. McClellan thought the Confederates had an overwhelming force, and maneuvered the Union Army cautiously and slowly in position for battle. For example, McClellan had Lee's Lost Special Order 191, operations plan, for more than 18 hours before the battle. This gave critical time to Lee, to consolidate the Army on key terrain east of Sharpsburg, Figure 2. (Crompton, 2014) (Hull & Allen, 2012).

With by victories in the South, Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee revised the Confederate war strategy to invade the North and capitalize on the momentum of the Army's victories against the Union. From Davis' and Lee's perspective it was now or never. The Confederate Army attrition of men and material during the first half of 1862 was significant and if the South did not take offensive soon the ability and timing to invade the North might not arise again (Crompton, 2014). The decision was to shift the current strategic objectives from the "Cause" defending the Southern states from Northern aggression, to invading the North to force the Union Army out in the open to fight, away from the North's defenses and supply bases (Stephens, 2012). This new strategy would provide the South uninterrupted harvest and time to reconstitute war torn farmland (Shaara, 2006). Winning a major battle on Northern soil would potentially cause the European countries, especially Britain and France, to recognize and legitimize the Confederate States of American as an independent country and support the South economically and intervene militarily. The plan was to cross the Potomac and invade Maryland. The Confederate leaders

incorrectly assumed that by invading a neutral state that Maryland would secede and become the twelfth Confederate state (Haffner & Lusitana [Disc 9] 2009)

### **Practices/Process of Lee and McClellan**

Lee and McClellan also differed not only in personal attributes and leadership, but are seen in the implementation of processes when preparing the armies for battle. As an experienced engineer, Lee was extremely adept at selecting key terrain and optimally positioning units for the upcoming battle. Based upon accurate intelligence Lee was able to arrive first at Antietam, with a small force, to occupy the strategically advantageous terrain while the rest of the dispersed Army was moving to consolidate on that terrain. The Union Army arrived after the Confederate Army and was unable to do reconnaissance of the terrain, so McClellan's forces had minimum knowledge of where the Lee's forces were located. Lee positioned the Army in a semi-circular defense that enables the Confederates to control the inside of the semicircle. This defensive technique allowed for soldiers, supplies, and the artillery to move short distances through the interior of the semicircle for repositioning to critical points along the defensive line. During the battle, the Union Army attacked the Confederate lines five times (Hull & Allen, 2012).

Each time, Lee repositioned enough cannons via these interior routes so that his artillery firepower was superior to that of McClellan's cannons. During the final assault, Lee's troops were overwhelmed and retreating and it seemed as if the Southern Army was ready to collapse, but the concentrated firepower of 45 repositioned cannons slowed the advancing Union troops until [A.P. Hill arrived with reinforcements, after a forced march] [from Harpers Ferry] toward the end of the battle (Chiles, 1988, in Hull & Allen, 2012, pp. 253 & 254).

The day before the battle, Lee had consolidated and better prepared the Confederate Army for the next day's battle. McClellan had developed excellent plans taking advantage of the high-tech rifled artillery that shot over long distances with superior accuracy and whose range far exceeded older Confederate smooth bored artillery pieces. McClellan's planned called for a simultaneous coordinated attack by four corps; three attacking the Confederates left flank and the other the right flank. The two reserve corps would exploit the weakened center from the coordinated attack. (Ballard, 2008).

Unfortunately, the implementation of the Union's original plan failed, instead of conducting a coordinated attack, McClellan "authorized a series of five sequential attacks, each of which was repulsed. Had any two [attacks] occurred simultaneously, they would have likely overwhelmed the inferior Confederate force" (Hull & Allen, 2012, p. 254). McClellan lost the strategic vision for the battle, which affected the command and control of the Army. As in previous battles, McClellan believed the Confederate forces overwhelmingly outnumber the Union Army. As a result, McClellan did not employ two reserve corps; one-third of the Union Army never saw action at Antietam. If those two reserve corps would have been employed, the Confederate Army would have most likely been destroyed. McClellan's failure was due to (Ballard, 2008) (Hull & Allen, 2012) (Linedecker, 2002):

- Sharing the big picture (vision) with generals.
- No common vision.
- Generals did not understand the plan.
- Lack of communication (McClellan made decisions remotely).
- Lack of intelligence and reconnaissance.

### **End Product for McClellan and Lee**

From a historical perspective, the Battle of Antietam was tactically a draw between the Confederate and the Union Armies, with a disastrous cost in soldier's lives. Strategically, the North won by achieving most of Lincoln's political objectives. Lee had to withdraw from Maryland across the Potomac River back into Virginia. The battle was a strategic loss for Davis and the Confederacy. Following the battle, McClellan was cautious again by not pursuing and destroying Lee's Army with the fresh two corps. The outcome of the battle was, European countries did not side with the Confederacy and Maryland did not secede as Lee and Davis had hoped. Also, the war did not end and went on until 1865. This strategic victory gave Lincoln the platform needed to delivering the Emancipation Proclamation. Furthermore, Lincoln's party "gained seats in both Houses of Congress" (Hull & Allen, 2012, p.256). Lincoln eventually replaced

McClellan with Burnside as the commander of the Army of the Potomac (Hull & Allen, 2012) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

### Comparison of Leaders

Both Lee and McClellan had some solid leadership attributes, but, Lee by far had more positive leadership skills, Table 1 - 5Ps Analysis of Lee and McClellan. Lee excelled as a strategist and a visionary leader who organized an underfed and outnumbered Army into an effective fighting force. Lee

**Table 1 – 5Ps Analysis of Lee and McClellan**

	<b>Lee</b>	<b>McClellan</b>
<b>Personal Attributes</b>	Respected, visionary, communicator, empower, analytical, risk taker, decisive, humble, trusting.	Intellectual, organizer, trainer, micro-manager, arrogant, lacked vision/ communication skills/decisiveness, conflict with superiors.
<b>Position</b>	Handpicked generals. Developed vision and strategy with commanders. Decide on strategy and trusted generals to implement. Army organized to be mutually supporting.	Detail oriented, lack vision and the ability to implement it. Made decisions for generals, but never communicated to them. Army not organized for flexibility. Cautious to engage the Confederates.
<b>Purpose</b>	To invade the North to end the war, support from Europe, sue for peace and have the North recognize the Confederacy.	Destroy the Confederate Army, end the war, unite the country, protect Northern cities, and Lincoln issued Emancipation Proclamation.
<b>Practices/Processes</b>	First to Antietam. Innovative use of employing the Army. Innovative deployment of artillery and use of limited resources. (Hull & Allen, 2012, p 257).	Second to Antietam. Had Lee's battle plan. Failed to implement strategy. Hands-off/Distant. Communicated poorly and missed several opportunities for victory given superior resources (Hull & Allen, 2012, p 257).
<b>Product</b>	Tactical draw, South lost strategic victory.	Tactical draw, North won a strategic victory.

(Hull & Allen, 2012) (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012)

trusted and empowered subordinates to be innovative and take risks. Furthermore, Lee was a tenacious and results oriented leader who led by example to build trust by inspiring and empowering subordinates to succeed. Lee was a better leader who should be emulated by leaders today. On the other hand, McClellan's ego, arrogance, and defensive attitude caused problems with superiors and subordinates. McClellan was an exceptional organizer and trainer, and was respected by the soldier, but failed to communicate and implement the vision. Never learning from mistakes, McClellan continually was reluctant to engage the Confederate Army. McClellan was consumed with politics in Washington, D.C. rather than fighting the Confederates. McClellan, by today's standards, would be considered a toxic leader who adversely impacts an organization (Hull & Allen, 2012) (Linedecker, 2002).

### **Battle of Fredericksburg Key Decisions, Circumstances, Outcomes, and Comparisons**

#### **Profiles (Attributes) of Lee and Burnside**

See Lee's profile and attributes under the Battle of Antietam's section for "Key Decisions, Circumstances, Outcomes, and Comparisons."

Ambrose Everett Burnside graduated from West Point in 1847 and went on to serve in the Mexican War. Earlier on in the Civil War, Burnside showed potential as a competent leader by capturing part of the North Carolina coast. Burnside was given command of the IX Corps in the Army of the Potomac and eventually offered and declined the command of the Army after McClellan failed to produce results during the Peninsula Campaign. Burnside was exhibiting loyalty to McClellan as the commander. As it turned out, Burnside erred on the side of desperate action; he lacked innovative thought and confidence as a leader. During Antietam, Burnside's single-mindedness to follow orders to precisely attack across Burnside's Bridge created an enormous tactical problem for the Army. Burnside's fixation with crossing the bridge caused critical loss of time and large number of casualties' with repeat attacks across Burnside's Bridge. This reinforces that Burnside was a poor tactician who was unable to see different alternatives and relied solely on frontal attacks. In September 1862, Burnside reluctantly took command of the Army of the Potomac for the Fredericksburg Campaign. Burnside was a decent planner, but failed to deviate from the



original plan which cost thousands of soldiers' lives at Fredericksburg were the Army was used for numerous frontal attacks against well-established Confederate defensive positions. Stephens (2012) writes: "General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected," wrote Grant. "He [Burnside] was not, however, fitted to command an Army. No one knew this better than himself" (p. 122) (Crompton, 2014) (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Lee and Burnside Role (Position) of a Leader**

As with differences between Lee and McClellan, so were the leadership differences between Burnside and Lee. Upon taking command of the Army of the Potomac, Burnside reorganized the Army into three grand corps. Burnside was a respected leader among the Army who had developed a decent plan to catch Lee by surprise by crossing the Rappahannock River to threaten Richmond. Unfortunately, the timing and implementation did not materialize for the Union Army. On November 15, 1862, Burnside moved the Army quickly to do a river crossing. Elements of the Army arrived in Falmouth on November 17, and Burnside's plans immediately deteriorated when the pontoon bridges to cross the Rappahannock did not arrive as scheduled and eventually arrived on November 25. Burnside lost the element of surprise. Keeping to the plan, Burnside conducted the first U.S. Army ever opposed river crossing into Fredericksburg (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

Lee thought Burnside would beat Lee's Army across the Rappahannock since Burnside moved slowly; Lee was able to establish almost an impregnable defensive position west of Fredericksburg on Marye's Heights. Again, Lee had the high ground and key terrain. As sound tactician, Lee again developed a plan with the commanders to protect Richmond and repel the Union Army. As before, Lee gave autonomy to the Confederate commanders to position infantry and artillery units. Lee appointed a new commander, Edward Alexander as the commander of ordnance, consolidating the Confederated artillery under one command. This change devastated the Union assaults on Marye's Heights. The Confederates observed the movements of Burnside's men (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

Not adjusting the plan and giving time to the Confederates to improve defenses, Burnside decided to assault the Confederate positions on Marye's Heights on December 13. The attack was a disaster for the Union Army, Burnside lost control and units continued to send in waves of soldiers. Burnside ordered no stop to the attack, and the surviving soldiers returned to the rear because there was no other option. Lee's defenses were so good that Alexander assured Longstreet, "that once [Porter's] guns opened up, a chicken could not survive on that field" (Crompton, 2014, p 148). The next day Burnside wanted to resume the attack, but did not. The subordinate generals changed Burnside's mind. Burnside was so fixated or irrational on the continuing the attack, Burnside lost the overall situational awareness of the battlefield. This debacle cost Burnside the command only after two and a half months (Crompton, 2014) (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Burnside and Lee Purpose or Cause**

With the mid-term elections, Lincoln was prodding Burnside to attack Lee and capture Richmond. Politically, Lincoln needs to be seen as a strong leader by producing a military success before the North public loses confidence in the administration. A victory in the south and capturing Richmond would solidify the Emancipation Proclamation to free slaves in the Confederacy. To avoid political criticism that previously plagued McClellan, Burnside wanted to move quickly against the South to capture Richmond and end the war. Burnside developed a plan to cross the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg. Then move quickly to capture the Confederate Capital of Richmond and draw out Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia between the Army of the Potomac and Richmond, providing the advantage to North (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

In 1862, the South was in bad shape with losses in the west to Union forces, especially the capture of New Orleans. The prices of goods doubled in Richmond. The price of bread became so high; there were food riots in the City. Lee also reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia and had Jackson and Longstreet promoted to lieutenant-generals, each commanding one wing or corps of the Army. Lee had about two weeks to concentrate the Southern forces on strategically defensible ground. The goals of the Confederacy

were to stop the Army of the Potomac from capturing Fredericksburg, and moving onto Richmond and to efficiently use limited resources, with minimum loss of soldiers during the battle (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

### **Practices/Process of Lee and Burnside**

Burnside and Lee both were respected as leaders by each respective Army. Both were good organizers and planners; however, this is where the similarities end. As with Antietam, Lee had affinity for selecting key terrain that tactically favored the Confederate Army. Lee empowered Longstreet to optimally position units defensively for the upcoming Battle of Fredericksburg. Due to the poor performance of the Confederate artillery at Antietam, Lee re-organized all of the Army's artillery under Porter Alexander. Alexander was another very capable individual that Lee hand-picked for the commander of ordinance which was intended to complement the Army's leadership. The day before the battle, Lee had consolidated and better prepared the Confederate Army for the next day's battle. Due to losing the element of surprise, Burnside's Army had to develop tactics to use in the first opposed river crossing. Also, tactics had to be developed for urban fighting in Fredericksburg which was the first in city combat encounter by both sides (Crompton, 2014) (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

Burnside relied on the pontoon bridges to be delivered according to schedule and kept to the original plan to cross the Rappahannock, even though the element of surprise had been lost. Burnside never developed alternatives to the plan and was inflexible in assaulting Fredericksburg and Marye's Heights with using hopeless frontal attacks that cost the Union Army approximately 13,000 soldiers. In Crompton (2014), Lee's most famous statements when looking over Marye's Heights: "It is well that war is so terrible," he said, "otherwise we should grow too fond of it" (p. 148) (Crompton, 2014) (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

### **End Product for Burnside and Lee**

The Battle of Fredericksburg was an overwhelming victory for the Confederacy and a disaster for Burnside. Burnside did not achieve the objectives of capturing Richmond and destroying the Army of

Northern Virginia. The loss had little effect on the mid-term elections in the North. Burnside was replaced, two months later, by Joe Hooker as the commander of the Army of the Potomac (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

From a Confederate perspective, the objectives were realized at the Battle of Fredericksburg and Antietam by stopping the Union Army from capturing Richmond and repelling the Union Army. Lee used minimum resources and loss of life to achieve this victory. This victory, along with others, emboldens Davis and Lee to invade the North again (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Comparison of Leaders**

Burnside and Lee had good personalities when dealing with individuals and were both respected among the troops, Table 2 – 5Ps Analysis of Burnside and Lee. Burnside carried out the original plan with no questions asked, no matter what happened in the execution. The goal of Burnside was to accomplish the plan even if circumstances dictated otherwise. Burnside lacked confidence to operate outside of the plan and failed at accomplishing the mission. During the battle Burnside lost control of the situation and units continued to send in waves of soldiers into the attack. Burnside had no idea that the soldiers were being slaughtered and never communicated an order to halt the attack. The surviving soldiers returned to the rear without any orders because there was no other option. Burnside had no concept of the carnage that happened on the battlefield and wanted to continue the frontal attack the next day. Modern leaders can use Burnside as a leader not model leadership techniques after; however, many lessons learned can be derived on what not to do when leading organizations (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012)..

Lee, compared to Burnside, excelled as a tactician, risk taker, and visionary leader who organized an outnumbered Army into an effective fighting force to defeat Burnside's Army. Lee empowered Longstreet to develop an impressive defensive plan which crushed the Union Army. Additionally, Lee selected Porter Alexander as the commander of ordinance who consolidated all of the artillery in one command that was able to support the entire Army. Lee was able to implement the plan by communicating

and having the senior officers involved in preparing it. Lee was a better leader than Burnside and should be used as a role model for contemporary leaders (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

**Table 2 – 5Ps Analysis of Burnside and Lee**

	<b>Lee</b>	<b>Burnside</b>
<b>Personal Attributes</b>	Respected, visionary, communicator, empower, analytical, risk taker, decisive, humble, trusting.	Fixated on one objective. Inflexible. Unwilling to see alternatives or change. Lacked communication skills. Decent organizer and planner.
<b>Position</b>	Handpicked leaders to augment the Army's capabilities. Developed vision and strategy with commanders. Decided on strategy and trusted generals to implement. Army organized to be mutually supporting.	Re-organized the Army of the Potomac into three grand divisions. Due to situation, involved in the first opposed river crossing and first urban combat. Cannot see the forest for the trees.
<b>Purpose</b>	To protect Richmond and Fredericksburg. Stop and repel the Union Army with minimum losses.	To surprise Lee and destroy the Confederate Army and capture Richmond.
<b>Practices/Processes</b>	First to Fredericksburg. Innovative use of employing artillery. Innovative deployment of defenses. Use of limited resources.	Delayed crossing and lost the element of surprise. Innovative use of opposed river crossing and urban fighting.
<b>Product</b>	Overwhelming victory.	Catastrophic loss.

(Crompton, 2014) (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

## **Battle of Gettysburg Key Decisions, Circumstances, Outcomes, and Comparisons**

### **Profiles (Attributes) of Lee and Meade**

See Lee's profile and attributes analysis under the Battle of Antietam's section for "Key Decisions, Circumstances, Outcomes, and Comparisons."

George Gordon Meade graduated from West Point in 1835. Meade served as brigade general during the Peninsula Campaign and was wounded twice to command a brigade at the Second Bull Run. Eventually, Meade commanded V Corps at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Meade was Lincoln's second choice to command the Army of the Potomac. Meade was a no-nonsense, hands-on fighting general

who excelled in the defense. On June 28, 1863 at 3 A.M., Meade received the order to take command of the Army just three day before the Battle of Gettysburg. Meade had a temper that was out of control which caused problems with senior officers. “His short temper earned him the nickname “Old Snapping Turtle” (Stephens, 2012, p. 93). The trust factor between the Army commander and subordinates was low. Meade changes the direction of the Army by establishing trust between the Army commander and subordinates. This one attribute gave sense of direction and purpose to the Army. Meade also was a stern disciplinarian, obstinate, cautious, and a perfectionist that motivated subordinates. Meade’s strategic objective was to evict Lee from Pennsylvania and did not understand the strategic objective of pursuing and destroying Lee’s Army. This revealed Meade’s misunderstanding of the strategic vision aligning to national objectives coming from the Lincoln administration. Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac from Gettysburg to Appomattox (Crompton, 2014) (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Meade and Lee Role (Position) of a Leader**

Meade’s role was that of a professional soldier who was a change agent that changed the culture of the Army of the Potomac Army. Upon arriving at Gettysburg, Meade immediately began building agreement and trust among the generals to stay and fight. Meade had the key terrain best suited for a defensive battle. Meade’s position was to bring the Army together to remove Lee from Pennsylvania which was not in alignment with the political strategy (Crompton, 2014) (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

Lee’s position was twofold, first to invade and bring the war to Northern towns, like Harrisburg. Secondly, bring the Army of the Potomac into the open and destroy it. Lee restructured the Army of northern Virginia into three corps after the death of Stonewall Jackson. Lee promoted leaders from within the ranks to command two of the three corps. Longstreet remained the only veteran corps commander. Lee thought by giving general direction to the new corps commanders that each would take the initiative, like Jackson did. The corps commanders were not Jackson and this hindered Lee at Gettysburg. Stuart was caught between the Union Army and Lee’s Army and was unable to provide intelligence and protection to Lee’s dispersed Army. Lee was on the offense and in unfamiliar territory, attempting to concentrate the

Army at Gettysburg. Lee's strengths as a superb leader turned out to be weaknesses during the battle (Crompton, 2014) (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Meade and Lee Purpose or Cause**

Meade's objective was simple, evict Lee from Pennsylvania. Meade sent the victory message to the Army, "he [Meade] included a phrase about removing the invaders from "our soil"" (Swain, April-June 2007, p. 43). Lincoln became distraught over Meade's comment and reprimanded Meade. Lincoln's opinion was "our soil" should include the entire country both North and South. The national objective was to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia which Meade did not understand (Swain, April-June 2007).

After Lee's Army of Northern Virginia victory at Chancellorsville, Lee and Jefferson Davis decided it was advantageous to invade the North for a second time. Lee knew that the Union Army's senior command structure was in chaos and the Army demoralized. Lee was under political pressure to develop a plan that would take the pressure off of the Confederate garrison at Vicksburg by invading the North. Also, Davis and Lee believed fighting one last major battle in the north would end the Civil War and gain independence for the Confederacy. Furthermore, the invasion of the North would provide the Confederates the opportunity to forage for subsistence from the rich Northern territory. Finally, the Army of Northern Virginia was in need of war materiel and supplies, especially shoes (Crompton, 2014) (Gettysburg, 2014).

### **Practices/Process of Lee and Meade**

In the Battle of Gettysburg, Meade ended up with the key terrain and established solid defensive positions that were in somewhat a semi-circle configuration. This allowed the Union Army to send reinforcements and re-position artillery quickly anywhere along the defensive line. Meade was able to immediately build consensus among the Army's commanders for planning the battle strategy at Gettysburg. Allowing subordinates to provide input to the plan motivated the Army's leadership which helped the morale of a demoralized Army. Meade's approaches to leadership changed the environment of the Army. Subordinates began to display initiative at critical decision points within the battle. Lee's

attributes where now being exhibited by Meade and the Army's subordinate commanders that eventually impacted the outcome of the battle (Crompton, 2014) (Gettysburg, 2014) (Swain, April-June 2007).

Unlike Antietam and Fredericksburg where Lee was in a defensive posture, Lee was now taking the offensive. Lee ordered the commanders not to engage the Union forces until the Army of Northern Virginia was concentrated and massed for an attack in force. Lee issued general guidance, to allow for initiative by the Army's commander. In this case, initiatives by the commanders were counterproductive to Lee's plan. For instance, Heth took the initiative to engage, what was believed to be smaller militia force. Heth's assumption was wrong and ended up creating momentum for the Confederates to become decisively engage with the Union Army before the Army was massed. Another stroke of initiative that led to engaging the Union Army was when Stuart was not available to screen and provide intelligence to Lee. Stuart had inadvertently miscalculated the speed of the Union Army moving north. This assumption led to the Union Army being positioned between Lee and Stuart. Stuart was unable to communicate with Lee. This left Lee blind and lack of intelligence to the overall situation developing in Gettysburg. Another situation is when Lee generalized an order to Ewell to take Culp's Hill, Jackson would have attack, but Ewell did not have the same attributes as Jackson. The objective was not taken. Lee's fixation with attacking and defeating the Union Army led to the defeat of the Confederate Army (Crompton, 2014) (Gettysburg, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

### **End Product for Meade and Lee**

Meade met the objective of evicting Lee from Pennsylvania. Meade used the phrase "our soil", meaning Pennsylvania, in the victory speech to the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln was upset with Grant using those words. In Lincoln's opinion "our soil" should have meant the entire country, both North and South. Furthermore, Meade did not achieve the national strategy to pursue and destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. Meade was strongly criticized for not ending the war and allowing Lee to escape to fight for another two years (Gettysburg, 2014) (Swain, April-June 2007).



Lee's loss at Gettysburg was catastrophic for the Confederacy. The garrison at Vicksburg was captured and the momentum shifted to the North. Davis' objective of ending the Civil War and gaining independence for the Confederacy was not realized. Finally, the Army of Northern Virginia did not obtain the war materiel and supplies required to supply the Army (Crompton, 2014) (Gettysburg, 2014).

### **Comparison of Leaders**

Lee and Meade (Table 3 – 5Ps Analysis of Lee and Meade) were both products of the U.S Army professional officer's corps before the start of the Civil War. Meade's strength was in fighting defensive battles and occupied the high ground first. Whether right or wrong in meeting or understanding each country's national objectives, Lee and Meade both established simple but obtainable visions that each Army could follow. Meade brought about a culture of trust within the Army of the Potomac by giving command of one wing of the Army to Major General Reynolds which was half of the Union Army. Before Meade took command, the trust between the previous Army commander and the subordinate generals was nonexistent. Entrusting and empowering, subordinate leaders brought about a sense of purpose, direction and motivation for the Union Army. Similar to Lee hand picking leaders, Meade was a strong proponent of having only regular Army officers lead only corps and armies, and not provide this opportunity to militia officers. As with Lee, Meade influenced a cultural change in the Army of the Potomac. Meade had a "reputation for being short-tempered and obstinate with junior officers and superiors alike" (Swain, April-June 2007, p. 44). Meade was also a perfectionist which resulted in caution. Meade was results oriented and did accomplish complex missions. At Gettysburg, Meade brought consensus among the commanders and communicated extensively with the Army. Meade did defeat Lee at Gettysburg, but did not understand the national objective to destroy the Confederate Army, so Meade did not accomplish the pursuit and elimination of Lee's Army which angered Lincoln. Meade did change the culture of the Army and commanded the Army of the Potomac until the end of the Civil War (Crompton, 2014) (Linedecker, 2002) (Stephens, 2012).

In contrast to Meade, Lee's Army was unable to get to the key terrain first and resorted to an offensive role. Also, Lee's strengths turned out to be weaknesses in prosecuting fight. After the death of Jackson, Lee had organized the Army from two corps into three corps. Lee's leadership of providing general guidance, empowering leaders, and expecting initiative among the Army's corps commanders did not work with the new corps commanders. Lee needed to be more direct and provide detailed guidance to his commanders in fighting the battle, unlike Jackson who took the initiative and innovation to win the battle. Lack of detailed guidance created failure to accomplish Lee's tactical objectives. Two instances are when Ewell was ordered to take Culp's Hill, but failed to act and the other is when Stuart's cavalry was caught between the advancing Union and Confederate armies. These examples are major turning points in the battle. Another example of allowing commanders too much latitude is when Lee ordered the commanders not to engage the Union forces until the Confederate Army was up and concentrated; Heth disregarded this order and attacked anyway because the assumption was there was only militia in Gettysburg which was wrong. Lee had communicated these orders, but was not direct enough for the commanders to understand Lee's intent. Possibly due to victory disease and over confidence, Lee had lost control of the Army while at Gettysburg. Lee was also fixated on attacking the Union Army at Gettysburg instead of moving to a more advantageous position. Lee's over confidence that the Army of Northern Virginia was invincible led to the ill-fated Pickett's Charge which decimated the Army. Where Meade was more methodical and gained control through consensus among the Union commanders (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Comparison of Burnside, Lee, McClellan, and Meade as Leaders**

When comparing Burnside, Lee, McClellan, and Meade as leaders, Lee reflects the attributes that leaders should emulate today, Table 4 – 5Ps Analysis Comparison of Burnside, Lee, McClellan, and

**Table 3 – 5Ps Analysis of Lee and Meade**

	<b>Lee</b>	<b>Meade</b>
<b>Personal Attributes</b>	Fixated (Victory Disease) on destroying the Union Army at Gettysburg. Respected. Gave general directions, empowered subordinates, analytical, risk taker, decisive, humble, and trusting. Army was invincible.	Change management, consensus maker, team builder, expert on defenses, objective, trust subordinates. Cautious. Decent organizer and planner. Temper. Obstinate with superiors and subordinates. Perfectionist.
<b>Position</b>	Reorganized Army into three corps. Handpicked leaders that did not understand Lee's command style. Developed vision and strategy with commanders. Decided on strategy and trusted generals to implement. Generals did not meet Lee's intent.	Changed culture of Army. Provided direction and increased morale of the Army. Provided simple and understandable vision to Army. Did not understand the national level objective.
<b>Purpose</b>	To attack Northern cities. Obtain supplies and shoes. Destroy Union Army and bring the war to an end and have the Confederacy recognized.	To evict Lee from Pennsylvania. Did not understand national objective to destroy Lee's Army.
<b>Practices/Processes</b>	Offensive mode. Coordinated attacks did not work. Lee's leadership styles led to new commanders' not understanding intent. Lee suffered from Victory disease. Used frontal attack against Union's center in order to win the war.	Occupied key terrain first. Established a defensive battle. Did not destroy Lee's Army. Used subordinates to build and implement plan. Trusted subordinates to do the right thing.
<b>Product</b>	Loss and withdrew back to Virginia.	Victory

Meade. Lee was a visionary leader who was able to translate the strategic vision into objectives for the subordinate commanders to understand. Lee's decisiveness and risk taking were reflected in the Army's strategy and objectives. To insure continuity among the Army, Lee selected leaders with complementary skills to implement the strategy and objectives. For example, Lee selected Longstreet, Jackson, and Stuart because of different skill sets, but complementary, which brought success to the Army of Northern Virginia. These commanders took innovative and decisive actions, and were able take Lee's broad guidance and turn it into victories. Lee earned respect and trust among Jefferson Davis and the Army's subordinate commanders and soldiers. At the Battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg, Lee was able to keep the Army of Northern Virginia intact to fight another day by either slipping away from or complete victory over the Union Army. During Gettysburg, Lee reorganized the Confederate Army

from two corps into three corps after the loss of Stonewall Jackson. Lee appointed two internal subordinate commanders to command two of those corps. Unfortunately, Ewell and Hill were newly appointed corps commanders at the Battle of Gettysburg and were not accustomed to the wide discretion Lee provided to the corps commanders. This may have led to lack of action to take the Culp's Hill, key defensive terrain, south of Gettysburg. Lee's discretion given to subordinate commander's led to losing contact with Stuart, who took the initiative to go on foraging missions and cause chaos among the northern populace. This created a situation where the Potomac Army moved faster than Stuart anticipated and came between Stuart and Lee. This left Lee with minimum intelligence and blind to the location of the Union Army at the initial stages of the Gettysburg's conflict. Another lesson from Gettysburg, Lee came into this battle with a series of victories at Chancellorsville and Second Manassas. Lee thought the Army of Northern Virginia was invincible and most likely had victory disease which led to the Pickett's Charge disaster. Lee became fixated, as Burnside did, with achieving one objective and not looking at other alternatives. McCausland writes,

...some civil war historians have suggested that Lee, despite his brilliance as a tactician, may have suffered from hubris. He [Lee] appears to have believed that he and his Army of Northern Virginia could not be defeated. As a result he orders the now famous "Pickett's Charge" on the third day, which resulted in disaster (McCausland, 2013, p. 1).

With Lee driven out the north at both the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg, the south was unable to claim a strategic victory which would result in recognition of the Confederacy by Europe and the Union as an independent country (Crompton, 2014) (McCausland, 2013) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

When comparing Burnside, McClellan, and Meade to Lee, these Union commanders had some positive, but mainly negative attributes as leaders and were less effective overall than Lee. All three Union generals were decent planners and strategists but failed to either understand or implement the vision and strategy.

Like Lee, McClellan was an intellectual who organized and trained the Army and cared deeply for the soldiers. Some shortcomings of McClellan were the lack of vision on the battlefield, micro-manager, decisiveness, arrogance, and conflict with superiors. McClellan had an ego and always incited conflict with individuals who disagreed with McClellan's position. At Antietam, McClellan had Lee's battle plan, Special Order 191, and was not able to destroy Lee's Army due to indecisiveness, assumed overwhelming Confederate numbers, and poor communication with subordinate commanders. McClellan even made decisions for the generals and never communicated the decisions onto to the commanders. This led to a lack of overall understanding by the generals to not to effectively implement the battle plan at Antietam. The lack of communicating the vision and implementing it, delayed the positioning of Union Army by 6 to 7 hours to flank Lee's Army, this allowed the Confederate Army to prepare defenses for the attack. Not understating the situational awareness and believing the Confederates had superior numbers led McClellan to be very cautious and pursuing Lee with two fresh corps. Strategically, McClellan pushed Lee out of Maryland but was unable to deliver the final knockout blow to Lee's Army; thereby, not ending the Civil War (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

Burnside was the least competent leader among the other three Civil War generals. Burnside was not very intellectual and a one dimensional leader. At the Battle of Fredericksburg, Burnside's lack of planning and implementation delayed crossing the Rappahannock River; thereby losing the element of surprise and giving Lee more time to consolidate the Confederate Army into a strong defense on Marye's Heights. Burnside, not seeing any alternatives to ford the river at different locations, eventually received the pontoon bridges, and as planned the Potomac Army crossed opposed at Fredericksburg. After occupying Fredericksburg, Burnside ordered the Union to attack the Confederate impregnable defensive positions west of Fredericksburg. Burnside was fixated on attacking the Confederates and again did not see alternatives to implement the original plan. Burnside was inflexible and did not empower subordinate

commanders to make independent decisions during the attack. Communications and Burnside's situational awareness was non-existent, creating an unrealistic expectation that the Army could defeat the Confederate defenders on Marye's Heights. Burnside had no idea that the Army was being massacred, carrying out multiple attacks. Burnside wanted to continue on with another attack the next day until the brigade commanders talked Burnside out of the new assault. The objective was to take Richmond, which never transpired; Burnside losing sight of the vision led to disastrous results for the Union Army at Fredericksburg (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

Meade was a soldier's soldier, and compared to Lee and the others, was very effective as a leader. Meade had been wounded leading soldiers. When Meade received the order to take command of the Army of the Potomac, the Army was already moving against the second invasion of the North by the Army of Northern Virginia. Upon taking command of the Union Army, Meade, began to change the culture of the Army. Meade decided to empower and trust subordinate commanders which were unheard of by previous Army commanders. Meade built consensus among the Army's leadership. According to Swain: "This provided a sense of direction, purpose, and motivation for the Army" (Swain, April-June 2007, p.43). Meade was able to take an Army with low morale and build an effective fighting force. Meade was a defensive expert and was able to occupy the high ground south of Gettysburg before Lee. As with Antietam and Fredericksburg, Lee occupied the key terrain first, but in Gettysburg the Union Army occupied the key defensive terrain. This resulted in Lee spreading the Army over a larger area that would be harder to command and control movement of units. Whereas Meade had a semi-circle defense and was able to move units' quickly critical spots along the Union's defensive line. Unfortunately, Meade was a perfectionist and had a severe temper, and was obstinate with both subordinates and superiors alike. This caused problems with superiors and the command. As a result of being a perfectionist, cautious, and not understanding the national strategy, Meade did not pursue Lee after the

**Table 4 – 5Ps Comparison of Burnside, Lee, McClellan, and Meade**

	<b>Lee</b>	<b>McClellan</b>	<b>Burnside</b>	<b>Meade</b>
<b>Personal Attributes</b>	Respected, visionary, communicator, empower subordinates, analytical, risk taker, decisive, humble, trusting, Good relationships	Intellectual, organizer, trainer, micro-manager, arrogant, lacked vision/ communication skills /decisiveness, conflict with superiors	Fixated on one objective-Not adaptable Inflexible to see alternatives. Lacked Vision/Empowerment/ communication skills. Didn't empower subordinates. Decent organizer and planner.	Change management, consensus maker, team builder, expert on defenses, objective, trusting. Cautious. Decent organizer and planner. Temper. Obstinate with superiors and subordinates. Perfectionist.
<b>Position</b>	Handpicked generals. Developed vision and strategy with commanders. Decided on strategy and trusted generals to implement. Army organized to be mutually supporting.	Detail oriented, lacked vision and the ability to implement it. Made decisions for generals, but never communicated to them. Army not organized for flexibility. Cautious/ indecisive.	Re-organized the Army of the Potomac into three grand divisions. Due to situation, involved in the first opposed river crossing and first urban combat. Cannot see the forest for the trees..	Changed culture of Army. Provided direction and increase morale of the Army. Provided simple and understandable vision to Army. Did not understand the national level objective.
<b>Purpose</b>	For Antietam and Gettysburg. To invade the North to end the war, support from Europe, have the North recognize the Confederacy. At Fredericksburg, Army protects Richmond.	Destroy the Confederate Army, end the war, unite the country, protect Northern cities, and Lincoln issued Emancipation Proclamation.	To surprise Lee and destroy the Confederate Army and capture Richmond.	To evict Lee from Pennsylvania. Did not understand national objective to destroy Lee's Army.
<b>Practices/ Processes</b>	First to Antietam and Fredericksburg. Innovative use of employing the Army. Innovative deployment of artillery and use of limited resources. (Hull & Allen, 2012, p 257). First to Antietam and Fredericksburg. Second to Gettysburg.	Second to Antietam. Had Lee's battle plan. Failed to implement strategy. Hands-off/Distant leader. Communicated poorly and missed several opportunities for victory given superior resources (Hull & Allen, 2012, p 257).	Delayed crossing and lost the element of surprise. Innovative use of opposed river crossing and urban fighting.	Occupied key terrain first. Established a defensive battle. Did not destroy Lee's Army. Used subordinates to build and implement plan. Trusted subordinates to do the right thing.
<b>Product</b>	Draw, South lost strategic victory at Antietam. Victory at Fredericksburg. Loss at Gettysburg.	Tactical draw. North won a strategic victory at Antietam.	Catastrophic loss at Fredericksburg.	Victory at Gettysburg.

victory at Gettysburg to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. However, Meade did have a simple vision to evict Lee from Pennsylvania, which Meade did at Gettysburg. This vision was communicated to the Army and effectively implemented. Meade remained the Army of the Potomac's commander until the end of the war (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012) (Swain, April-June 2007).

After analyzing and comparing Civil War leadership attributes and decisions made among the different leaders, now this study will examine the application to acquisition leadership in Chapter 5.

## **Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **Application to Acquisition Leaders**

Chapter 4 addresses the first part of the question: What leadership and decision making lessons can be learned from these battles and are they applicable to current day leaders? If so, how do lessons learned apply to acquisition programs and leaders of today? This chapter examines some of the most important lessons learned, Table 5 - Traits and Lesson Learned, from Civil War leaders and how they can be used by today's acquisition leaders.

#### **Communicate the Vision/Strategy**

It is critical to develop a sound achievable vision and strategy for an organization to be effective. Acquisition leaders must develop an effective and obtainable vision for the organization. The program leadership should communicate this vision to the entire organization through town halls, integrated product teams, staff meetings, or program websites. The leadership should also develop this experience in junior and mid-level managers by involving them in the development of a program office vision/strategy, and allowing program management types and functional leaders to form an integrated product team to write a vision statement for the entire organization. Lee was exceptional at communicating the vision and strategy with the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee clearly communicated the vision and strategy across the Army. This was accomplished by involving the senior commanders in the development of the vision and strategy. This ensured each commander knew the vision and strategic objectives of each campaign. Also, the commanders understood how to implement steps to meet the vision and strategic objectives. Lee and subordinate commanders reinforced the vision by emphasizing what was important by walking the talk. Today's acquisition leaders should clearly communicate the vision and practice the vision in the day-to-day operation of a program. Program leaders must make decisions and develop objectives and goals to reinforce the vision. Moschler and Weitzner (2011), write, "If leaders provide lip service to safety and quality but emphasize schedule and staying on budget, the workers in the organization will quickly realize what is important" (p.23) (Crompton, 2014) (Moschler & Weitzner 2011) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).



### **Empower the Workforce**

In a program office there are many diverse functional areas, and as a leader it would be difficult to micro-manage each area without effecting morale. Program leadership should empower the workforce to be innovative and come up with ideas to make the organization more effective. This can be accomplished through product improvement initiatives and rewarding success. Lee made good use of rewarding creativity and innovation in the Army. For example, Lee promoted Longstreet and Jackson to lieutenant general to command the two wings (corps) of the Army of Northern Virginia. Compare this to Burnside who was unwilling to be open to new alternatives from the subordinate commanders. At Fredericksburg, Burnside was unwilling to see alternatives or options proposed by the other commanders. Unwillingness to give control to and micro-manage the subordinate commanders created a situation where leaders did not show any initiative on the battlefield. Also, this situation caused the slow movement of units and losing the element of surprise, and the late arrival of the pontoon bridges. This lack of empowerment by Burnside led to a disastrous outcome and needless loss of life at Fredericksburg (Crompton, 2014) (Moschler & Weitzner 2011) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Communication**

Communication within a program office is the backbone of success in ultimately developing, producing, fielding, and sustaining acquisition products. Identifying and communicating with program stakeholders is imperative to the success of the program. Honest and frank communication with the stakeholders is important to the creditability of the program office. The integrated product teams must communicate vertically and horizontally, as well as to external organizations, such as congress, Department of the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. McClellan at Antietam is a lesson learned in poor communication. During the Battle of Antietam, McClellan never convened any staff meetings to communicate the strategy, battle plans, or receive feedback with the generals. McClellan went even as far as making decisions for generals, but never communicating the decisions to the commanders.

An effective acquisition leader will over communicate to ensure the program is understood among the leadership and workers (Crompton, 2014) (Moschler & Weitzner 2011) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Fixation/Short-Sightedness**

Program leaders must not have a myopic view of competing efforts and become fixated with one objective to the harm of the entire program. Program “Leaders can lose sight of what is important to the program and be unaware of what is taking place” in other areas of the program office (Moschler & Weitzner, 2011, p.23). A program leader may decide to reprogram funding from one effort to another without understanding the second and third order affects. This could adversely impact the program losing funding that could delay contract award, personnel, and production. This same situation happened to Burnside at Fredericksburg, where attacking Marye’s Heights is the only option Burnside could see defeating the Confederates. There were other options available to Burnside, such as withdrawing and assaulting the Confederates in a more advantageous position for the Union Army. Another example is when Lee ordered Pickett’s Charge against the Union defenses. With a string of earlier victories against the Union Army, Lee thought the Army of Northern Virginia was invincible and could be counted on to defeat Union Army at Gettysburg. Lee’s “victory disease” added to his fixation with defeating the Union which led to the loss at Gettysburg. Program managers must guard against and be aware of contracting this fixation syndrome (Moschler & Weitzner 2011) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Decision Making**

Program leadership must be able to make timely and informed decisions. Acquisition leaders must obtain the facts and assumptions to make an informed decision. Also, program leaders must build consensus among the critical stakeholders, both subordinate and superior, to get buy-in from all parties. Meade involved subordinates in the decision making process by trusting in the subordinate commanders, which did not occur under previous Army commanders. Meade built consensus for decision making among the Army’s leadership. Meade was not afraid to ask for input from subordinate commanders. Program leaders should learn to trust and include subordinates in the leader’s decision making process. This can be

accomplished through including junior and mid-level leaders in the decision making process as part of the integrated product teams to develop these decision making skills. Also, send leaders to schools and training events to develop these skills (Crompton, 2014) (Moschler & Weitzner 2011) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Self-Confidence**

This trait is imperative for an acquisition leader to be successful. The manager's strong commitment and dedication to the effort infects the other members of the organization to commit to successfully accomplishing the mission. As with Lee, he believed in himself and that the Army of Northern Virginia could accomplish anything against the Union Army. Lee usually won or tied at each battle, or at least was able to escape with the Confederate Army intact to fight another day. At Fredericksburg, Lee was confident in his skills and commanders to influence and organize the Army to fight a defensive battle against the Union Army. Lee was a confident and highly skilled leader compared to Burnside, who lacked confidence in himself and initially did not want to take command of the Union Army. Burnside's lack of confidence created a misunderstanding of the battlefield situation and reckless behavior that culminated in a catastrophic loss by the Union Army at the Battle of Fredericksburg. The lesson learned from Fredericksburg is no organization will follow a leader who lacks self-confidence, does not take ownership in the position, and does not believe in himself to successfully carrying out the mission (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Clear Goals/Objectives**

A program manager's inherent responsibility is to influence and determine the direction of the program. Successful leaders establish clear achievable goals and objectives for subordinates to understand and act on. Lee, along with his corps commanders, were masters of creating a simple and understandable vision for his Army. Lee would include his commanders in developing the vision and dissecting it into short term goals and objectives for the Army. Setting these clear achievable objectives allowed subordinates to understand the overall vision and mission in which to measure their progress by.

McClellan, at Antietam, was not able to provide a common vision, goals, and objectives to his commanders. This lack of understanding by McClellan's subordinates led to the strategy not being correcting implemented (Crompton, 2014) (Moschler & Weitzner 2011) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Selection/Training of Personnel**

Having individuals with the right experiences and complementary skill sets, within the program office, are important for the efficient functioning of the organization. Acquisition leaders must have the ability to select the person for the right job. Lee had the ability to select the commanders that complemented each other's strengths and weaknesses. For example, Lee selected Jackson and Longstreet because they complemented Lee's and each other's personalities, strengths, weaknesses, and skills. This can be seen in how Lee organized the Army of Northern Virginia into two parts, one wing "the hammer" commanded by "Stonewall" Jackson and the other wing "the anvil" by James "Pete" Longstreet, (Shaara, 2006). Another example is when the Confederate Army had problems with managing the artillery, so Lee appointed Porter Alexander as the Army's chief of ordinance. This enabled the consolidation of all artillery under one commander for better flexibility, efficiencies, command, and control during each battle. The program manager should weigh peoples' capabilities before assigning them into positions where they may fail. The leader should assess each individual's capabilities and experiences against their shortcomings and provide training and developmental assignments to mitigate those weaknesses. These skills should be honed or developed before assigning people into more difficult and responsible positions (Crompton, 2014) (Gadeken, 2004) (Stephens, 2012).

### **Trust**

Trust between acquisition leaders, their subordinates, and superiors are critical to the efficient operation of programs. This trait is important for leaders to possess and exhibit with the acquisition workforce. Leaders must establish trust immediately upon being assigned to an organization. This is the basis for a leader to establish credibility among the workforce and superiors. Trust brings predictability, consistency in decisions, reliability, and accountability as a leader. When Meade was informed he was to

assume command of the Army, the Army was already pursuing Lee's Army into Pennsylvania, during the second invasion of the North. With morale being low between the prior commander and the Army's other subordinate generals, Meade immediately took an approach by trusting in his subordinates. This trust building between the commander and subordinates brought back motivation and purpose to the Army. The trust between Meade and his commanders enable them to agree to stay and fight at Gettysburg. Trustworthiness is a powerful trait that acquisition leaders should strive to achieve and maintain (Crompton, 2014) (Swain, 2007).

### **Accountability**

A good acquisition leader will take responsibility for what goes right or wrong within the organization. Leaders in a program office must acknowledge and assume responsibility for their actions and decisions. After Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, he sent a letter of resignation to Jefferson Davis, assuming full responsibility for the defeat of the Confederate Army. Davis turned Lee's request down to resign. Lee's action reflects his responsibility and accountability for the defeat of the Confederate Army. As did Lee, acquisition leaders should take responsibility for any consequences, good or bad, that come out of a program (Shaara, 2006).

### **Explore Alternatives**

In the complex environment of acquisition, leaders should always have situational awareness to develop alternatives regarding programs. Leaders should be open to new ideas. When leaders encounter a complex programmatic problem, they should approach the problem with a disciplined decision making process to look at all reasonable alternatives. As acquisition leaders, it is incumbent upon us to analyze each alternative for the best solution. Furthermore, as programs are worked, leaders should always identify potential and work alternatives to resolve any issue. During Antietam and Fredericksburg, Burnside always went with the plan and never seemed to deviate to look at different alternatives as the battle situation developed. Lee on the other hand, was flexible and positioned his Army on key terrain as the situation

developed. As acquisition leaders, we must think ahead and change the programs' acquisitions strategies as the situation dictates (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

**Table 5 – Traits and Lessons Learned**

Trait	Lesson Learned
<b>Visionary</b>	Establish a clear and simple vision with involvement by subordinate leaders. This ensures the vision is understandable, and communicated through objectives and goals.
<b>Empower Workforce</b>	Provide general guidance and let subordinates be innovative in making decisions at the lowest level. Do not micro-manage efforts and let the workforce come up with process improvements. Reward success.
<b>Communicate</b>	Communicate, Communicate, and Communicate! Establish Integrated Product Teams to discuss efforts with stakeholders. Be honest and frank. Over communicate with internal and external stakeholders.
<b>Fixation</b>	Do not focus on one effort at the detriment of others. Be aware of having a myopic view of a program and losing sight of other priorities. Continually assess what is important to the program.
<b>Decision Making</b>	Make fact based, timely and accurate decisions without hesitation. Be decisive as a leader and use tools like the Military Decision Making Process. Train personnel in making decisions.
<b>Self-Confidence</b>	Believe in self and organization. Must commit and dedicate self to accomplishing the mission. Lead by example, take charge, and this will infect the organization with confidence.
<b>Clear Goals/Objectives</b>	Leaders must set clear and realistic organizational goals and objectives. Must align to the vision. Do not establish in a vacuum.
<b>Selection/Training of Personnel</b>	Hire people that are capable and complement your leadership style. Develop leaders internally as part of succession planning.
<b>Trust</b>	Leaders must establish trust immediately within an organization. Trust subordinates to do the right thing.
<b>Accountability</b>	Take responsibility for what goes right or wrong within your organization. Do the right thing as a leader.
<b>Explore Alternatives</b>	Be open to new ideas. Always explore options for complex efforts using sound facts and assumptions.
<b>Accurate Intelligence</b>	Leaders should keep apprised of opportunities, external and internal threats to an organization or program. Leaders glean intelligence that may affect the program.

### **Accurate Intelligence**

In program management, acquisition leaders should obtain accurate intelligence on the external environment and stakeholders. Leaders should network to ensure they keep apprised of risks confronting the programs. Some of these risks include: competition for funding from other programs, i.e., bill payer; stakeholder support; reduction or termination of programs; impacts from congress or the Office of the Secretary of defense in requirements or funding; users/requirements communities; and, low obligation/disbursement rates. It is imperative that leaders keep aware of the external environment so they can adjust to the changes impacting the programs. Lee was unable to keep track of his external environment at Gettysburg. This occurred because Stuart's Cavalry let the Union Army come between his cavalry and Lee's Army. Stuart was the eyes and ears of the Army was unable to keep Lee informed of the Union's order of battle, strength, and location. Lee was blind at the start of Gettysburg. Burnside also did not have situational awareness during the battle of Fredericksburg. The lack of accurate informational regarding the external environment led to a disastrous loss by the Union Army. Program managers should always keep track of the external environment confronting each program including competitors and the customers, the soldiers (Crompton, 2014) (Shaara, 2006).

### **Conclusion**

Acquisition leaders are ultimately responsible for the program they are managing. Success of the program is typically measured in cost, schedule, and performance. In addition to a combination of management and technical skills, and for program managers to be truly successful, they must first be a good leader. To be effective leaders, they need to understand that leadership is about people. As Gaden (2005) writes:

To put it another way, effective PMs share a common foundation of basic knowledge and skills. These are the necessary—but not sufficient—building blocks for top performance. Top performing PMs also exhibit key leadership behaviors that allow them to employ these building blocks more effectively to achieve superior results. (P. 11).

This study revealed that there are strategic leadership decisions, implications and lessons learned from three Civil War battles which do apply to today's acquisition leaders in becoming more effective leaders. The lessons learned derived from this research can be used by contemporary leaders to prepare and train others to assume acquisition leadership roles. "Leadership is clearly an art and not a science, and we can learn much from the past. As we prepare for the future, leadership is as critical to any organization today as it was during [the Civil War leaders]" (McCausland, 2013, p.1). In closing, leadership is about ultimately influencing people.



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**Glossary of Acronyms and Terms**

AT&L.....	Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
DAG.....	Defense Acquisition Guidebook
DAU.....	Defense Acquisition University
DCMA.....	Defense Contract Management Agency
DoD.....	Department of Defense
DoDD.....	Department of Defense Directive
GAO .....	Government Accountability Office
GPQ .....	Group Process Questionnaire
H <sub>0</sub> .....	Null Hypothesis
H <sub>1</sub> .....	Alternate Hypothesis
IPPD .....	Integrated Product and Process Development
IPT .....	Integrated Product Team
PEO .....	Program Executive Officer
PM .....	Project Manager
USD(AT&L) ..	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics



### Author Biography

Mr. Paul Coles is a Senior Service College Fellow, and most recently served as the Business Manager for Project Manager Transportation Systems, Program Executive Officer, Combat Support & Combat Service Support. Mr. Coles was responsible for the leadership, management, and oversight of all business personnel and functions such as: finance, cost estimating, scheduling, earned value and contracting over one of the Army's largest portfolios with a FY16 budget of \$2.9B, spread over six diversified product offices.



In previous assignments, Mr. Coles led and managed initiatives on multiple ACAT 1C/D programs such as: High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), Palletized Load System (PLS), Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT), Stryker, Future Combat System (FCS), Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP), Abrams, and, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). Additionally, he managed all financial aspects on numerous other ACAT III efforts in the following project management offices: Transportation Systems, Joint Combat Support Systems, and Force Projection, which prepared him to take on more challenging acquisition assignments.

He retired after 20 years of Active and Reserve military service as an Army Officer, including multiple deployments and assignments at the company, battalion, brigade, corps and Army culminating in an assignment at the Coalition/Joint Staff level in CJ 37, Readiness Branch, United States Forces Korea.

Mr. Coles is currently pursuing a Masters in Global Leadership and Management at Lawrence Technological University. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the University of Central Missouri, Warrensburg, MO (1981), and a Master of Public Administration from Troy University, Troy, AL (1989). Mr. Coles is a graduate of Combined Arms Services Staff School (1993) and the Command and General Staff College (1996). Mr. Coles has been an Acquisition Corps membership since 2006 and is DAWIA Level III Certified in both Business-Financial Management and in Program Management. He is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, Advanced Acquisition Program in 2002, which provided him the leadership and acquisition experience to lead a multifaceted acquisition workforce.

Mr. Coles has worked in multiple foreign countries which include Germany, Egypt, Iraq, Korea, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, as well as throughout the United States. Mr. Coles has earned numerous civilian and military awards and decorations. His civilian awards include: Commander's Award for Civilian Service (2006) and Superior Civilian Service Award (2003). Mr. Coles' military awards include: Army Meritorious Service Medals, Army Commendation Medals, Army of Occupation Medal (Berlin), the Expert Infantryman's Badge, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Ranger Tab, and Parachute Badge.